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Abstract
Adversarial training yields robust models against
a specific threat model, e.g., L∞ adversarial ex-
amples. Typically robustness does not generalize
to previously unseen threat models, e.g., other Lp
norms, or larger perturbations. Our confidence-
calibrated adversarial training (CCAT) tackles
this problem by biasing the model towards low
confidence predictions on adversarial examples.
By allowing to reject examples with low confi-
dence, robustness generalizes beyond the threat
model employed during training. CCAT, trained
only on L∞ adversarial examples, increases ro-
bustness against larger L∞, L2, L1 and L0 at-
tacks, adversarial frames, distal adversarial ex-
amples and corrupted examples and yields bet-
ter clean accuracy compared to adversarial train-
ing. For thorough evaluation we developed novel
white- and black-box attacks directly attacking
CCAT by maximizing confidence. For each threat
model, we use 7 attacks with up to 50 restarts
and 5000 iterations and report worst-case robust
test error, extended to our confidence-thresholded
setting, across all attacks.
1. Introduction
Deep networks were shown to be susceptible to adversarial
examples (Szegedy et al., 2014): adversarially perturbed
examples that cause mis-classification while being nearly
“imperceptible”, i.e., close to the original example. Here,
“closeness” is commonly enforced by constraining the Lp
norm of the perturbation, referred to as threat model. Since
then, numerous defenses against adversarial examples have
been proposed. However, many were unable to keep up
with more advanced attacks (Athalye et al., 2018; Athalye
& Carlini, 2018). Moreover, most defenses are tailored to
only one specific threat model.
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Figure 1: Adversarial Training (AT) versus our CCAT.
We plot the confidence in the direction of an adversarial
example. AT enforces high confidence predictions for the
correct class on the L∞-ball of radius  (“seen” attack
during training, top left). As AT enforces no particular bias
beyond the -ball, adversarial examples can be found right
beyond this ball. In contrast CCAT enforces a decaying
confidence in the correct class up to uniform confidence
within the -ball (top right). Thus, CCAT biases the model
to extrapolate uniform confidence beyond the -ball. This
behavior also extends to “unseen” attacks during training,
e.g., L2 attacks (bottom), such that adversarial examples
can be rejected via confidence-thresholding.
Adversarial training (Goodfellow et al., 2015; Madry et al.,
2018), i.e., training on adversarial examples, can be regarded
as state-of-the-art. However, following Fig. 1, adversarial
training is known to “overfit” to the threat model “seen”
during training, e.g., L∞ adversarial examples. Thus, ro-
bustness does not extrapolate to larger L∞ perturbations,
cf. Fig. 1 (top left), or generalize to “unseen” attacks, cf.
Fig. 1 (bottom left), e.g., other Lp threat models (Sharma &
Chen, 2018; Trame`r & Boneh, 2019; Li et al., 2019; Kang
et al., 2019; Maini et al., 2020). We hypothesize this to
be a result of enforcing high-confidence predictions on ad-
versarial examples. However, high-confidence predictions
are difficult to extrapolate beyond the adversarial examples
seen during training. Moreover, it is not meaningful to ex-
trapolate high-confidence predictions to arbitrary regions.
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Finally, adversarial training often hurts accuracy, resulting
in a robustness-accuracy trade-off (Tsipras et al., 2019; Stutz
et al., 2019; Raghunathan et al., 2019; Zhang et al., 2019).
Contributions: We propose confidence-calibrated adver-
sarial training (CCAT) which trains the network to predict
a convex combination of uniform and (correct) one-hot dis-
tribution on adversarial examples that becomes more uni-
form as the distance to the attacked example increases. This
is illustrated in Fig. 1. Thus, CCAT implicitly biases the
network to predict a uniform distribution beyond the threat
model seen during training, cf. Fig. 1 (top right). Robustness
is obtained by rejecting low-confidence (adversarial) exam-
ples through confidence-thresholding. As a result, having
seen only L∞ adversarial examples during training, CCAT
improves robustness against previously unseen attacks, cf.
Fig. 1 (bottom right), e.g., L2, L1 and L0 adversarial exam-
ples or larger L∞ perturbations. Furthermore, robustness
extends to adversarial frames (Zajac et al., 2019), distal ad-
versarial examples (Hein et al., 2019), corrupted examples
(e.g., noise, blur, transforms etc.) and accuracy of normal
training is preserved better than with adversarial training.
For thorough evaluation, following best practices (Carlini
et al., 2019), we adapt several state-of-the-art white- and
black-box attacks (Madry et al., 2018; Ilyas et al., 2018; An-
driushchenko et al., 2019; Narodytska & Kasiviswanathan,
2017; Khoury & Hadfield-Menell, 2018) to CCAT by ex-
plicitly maximizing confidence and improving optimiza-
tion through a backtracking scheme. In total, we con-
sider 7 different attacks for each threat model (i.e., Lp for
p ∈ {∞, 2, 1, 0}), allowing up to 50 random restarts and
5000 iterations each. We report worst-case robust test er-
ror, extended to our confidence-thresholded setting, across
all attacks and restarts, on a per test example basis. We
demonstrate improved robustness against unseen attacks
compared to standard adversarial training (Madry et al.,
2018), TRADES (Zhang et al., 2019), adversarial training
using multiple threat models (Maini et al., 2020) and two
detection methods (Ma et al., 2018; Lee et al., 2018), while
training only on L∞ adversarial examples.
We make our code (training and evaluation) and pre-trained
models publicly available at davidstutz.de/ccat.
2. Related Work
Adversarial Examples: Adversarial examples can roughly
be divided into white-box attacks, i.e., with access to the
model gradients, e.g. (Goodfellow et al., 2015; Madry et al.,
2018; Carlini & Wagner, 2017b), and black-box attacks,
i.e., only with access to the model’s output, e.g. (Ilyas
et al., 2018; Narodytska & Kasiviswanathan, 2017; An-
driushchenko et al., 2019). Adversarial examples were also
found to be transferable between models (Liu et al., 2017;
Xie et al., 2019). In addition to imperceptible adversarial
examples, adversarial transformations, e.g., (Engstrom et al.,
2019; Alaifari et al., 2019), or adversarial patches (Brown
et al., 2017) have also been studied. Recently, projected
gradient ascent to maximize the cross-entropy loss or surro-
gate objectives, e.g., (Madry et al., 2018; Dong et al., 2018;
Carlini & Wagner, 2017b), has become standard. Instead,
we directly maximize the confidence in any but the true
class, similar to (Hein et al., 2019; Goodfellow et al., 2019),
in order to effectively train and attack CCAT.
Adversarial Training: Numerous defenses have been pro-
posed, of which several were shown to be ineffective (Atha-
lye et al., 2018; Athalye & Carlini, 2018). Currently, adver-
sarial training is standard to obtain robust models. While
it was proposed in different variants (Szegedy et al., 2014;
Miyato et al., 2016; Huang et al., 2015), the formulation by
(Madry et al., 2018) received considerable attention and has
been extended in various ways: (Shafahi et al., 2020; Pe´rolat
et al., 2018) train on universal adversarial examples, in (Cai
et al., 2018), curriculum learning is used, and in (Trame`r
et al., 2018; Grefenstette et al., 2018) ensemble adversar-
ial training is proposed. The increased sample complexity
(Schmidt et al., 2018) was addressed in (Lamb et al., 2019;
Carmon et al., 2019; Alayrac et al., 2019) by training on
interpolated or unlabeled examples. Adversarial training on
multiple threat models is also possible (Trame`r & Boneh,
2019; Maini et al., 2020). Finally, the observed robustness-
accuracy trade-off has been discussed in (Tsipras et al.,
2019; Stutz et al., 2019; Zhang et al., 2019; Raghunathan
et al., 2019). Adversarial training has also been combined
with self-supervised training (Hendrycks et al., 2019). In
contrast to adversarial training, CCAT imposes a target dis-
tribution which tends towards a uniform distribution for
large perturbations, allowing the model to extrapolate be-
yond the threat model used at training time. Similar to
adversarial training with an additional “abstain” class (Laid-
law & Feizi, 2019), robustness is obtained by rejection. In
our case, rejection is based on confidence thresholding.
Detection: Instead of correctly classifying adversarial ex-
amples, several works (Gong et al., 2017; Grosse et al.,
2017; Feinman et al., 2017; Liao et al., 2018; Ma et al.,
2018; Amsaleg et al., 2017; Metzen et al., 2017; Bhagoji
et al., 2017; Hendrycks & Gimpel, 2017; Li & Li, 2017; Lee
et al., 2018) try to detect adversarial examples. However,
several detectors have been shown to be ineffective against
adaptive attacks aware of the detection mechanism (Carlini
& Wagner, 2017a). Recently, the detection of adversarial ex-
amples by confidence, similar to our approach with CCAT,
has also been discussed (Pang et al., 2018). Instead, Good-
fellow et al. (2019) focus on evaluating confidence-based
detection methods using adaptive, targeted attacks maximiz-
ing confidence. Our attack, although similar in spirit, is
untargeted and hence suited for CCAT.
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3. Generalizable Robustness by Confidence
Calibration of Adversarial Training
To start, we briefly review adversarial training on L∞ ad-
versarial examples (Madry et al., 2018), which has become
standard to train robust models, cf. Sec. 3.1. However,
robustness does not generalize to larger perturbations or
unseen attacks. We hypothesize this to be the result of en-
forcing high-confidence predictions on adversarial examples.
CCAT addresses this issue with minimal modifications, cf.
Sec. 3.2 and Alg. 1, by encouraging low-confidence predic-
tions on adversarial examples. During testing, adversarial
examples can be rejected by confidence thresholding.
Notation: We consider a classifier f : Rd → RK with K
classes where fk denotes the confidence for class k. While
we use the cross-entropy loss L for training, our approach
also generalizes to other losses. Given x ∈ Rd with class
y ∈{1, . . . ,K}, we let f(x) := argmax k fk(x) denote the
predicted class for notational convenience. For f(x) = y,
an adversarial example x˜ = x + δ is defined as a “small”
perturbation δ such that f(x˜) 6= y, i.e., the classifier changes
its decision. The strength of the change δ is measured by
some Lp-norm, p ∈ {0, 1, 2,∞}. Here, p =∞ is a popular
choice as it leads to the smallest perturbation per pixel.
3.1. Problems of Adversarial Training
Following (Madry et al., 2018), adversarial training is given
as the following min-max problem:
min
w
E
[
max
‖δ‖∞≤
L(f(x+ δ;w), y)
]
(1)
with w being the classifier’s parameters. During mini-batch
training the inner maximization problem,
max
‖δ‖∞≤
L(f(x+ δ;w), y), (2)
is approximately solved. In addition to the L∞-constraint,
a box constraint is enforced for images, i.e., x˜i = (x +
δ)i ∈ [0, 1]. Note that maximizing the cross-entropy loss is
equivalent to finding the adversarial example with minimal
confidence in the true class. For neural networks, this is
generally a non-convex optimization problem. In (Madry
et al., 2018) the problem is tackled using projected gradient
descent (PGD), initialized using a random δ with ‖δ‖∞ ≤ .
In contrast to adversarial training as proposed in (Madry
et al., 2018), which computes adversarial examples for the
full batch in each iteration, others compute adversarial ex-
amples only for half the examples of each batch (Szegedy
et al., 2014). Instead of training only on adversarial exam-
ples, each batch is divided into 50% clean and 50% adver-
sarial examples. Compared to Eq. (1), 50%/50% adversarial
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Figure 2: Extrapolation of Uniform Predictions. We plot
the confidence in each class along an interpolation between
two test examples x and x′, “2” and “7”, on MNIST (LeCun
et al., 1998): (1 − κ)x + κx′ where κ is the interpola-
tion factor. CCAT quickly yields low-confidence, uniform
predictions in between both examples, extrapolating the
behavior enforced within the -ball during training. Regu-
lar adversarial training, in contrast, consistently produces
high-confidence predictions, even on unreasonable inputs.
training effectively minimizes
E
[
max
‖δ‖∞≤
L(f(x+ δ;w), y)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
50% adversarial training
+E
[L(f(x;w), y)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
50% “clean” training
. (3)
This improves test accuracy on clean examples compared
to 100% adversarial training but typically leads to worse
robustness. Intuitively, by balancing both terms in Eq. (3),
the trade-off between accuracy and robustness can already
be optimized to some extent (Stutz et al., 2019).
Problems: Trained on L∞ adversarial examples, the robust-
ness of adversarial training does not generalize to previously
unseen adversarial examples, including larger perturbations
or other Lp adversarial examples. We hypothesize that
this is because adversarial training explicitly enforces high-
confidence predictions on L∞ adversarial examples within
the -ball seen during training (“seen” in Fig. 1). However,
this behavior is difficult to extrapolate to arbitrary regions in
a meaningful way. Thus, it is not surprising that adversarial
examples can often be found right beyond the -ball used
during training, cf. Fig. 1 (top left). This can be described
as “overfitting” to the L∞ adversarial examples used dur-
ing training. Also, larger -balls around training examples
might include (clean) examples from other classes. Then,
Eq. (2) will focus on these regions and reduce accuracy as
considered in our theoretical toy example, see Proposition
2, and related work (Jacobsen et al., 2019b;a).
As suggested in Fig. 1, both problems can be addressed
by enforcing low-confidence predictions on adversarial ex-
amples in the -ball. In practice, we found that the low-
confidence predictions on adversarial examples within the
-ball are extrapolated beyond the -ball, i.e., to larger pertur-
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Algorithm 1 Confidence-Calibrated Adversarial Train-
ing (CCAT). The only changes compared to standard ad-
versarial training are the attack (line 4) and the probability
distribution over the classes (lines 6 and 7), which becomes
more uniform as distance ‖δ‖∞ increases. During testing,
low-confidence (adversarial) examples are rejected.
1: while true do
2: choose random batch (x1, y1), . . . , (xB , yB).
3: for b = 1, . . . ,B/2 do
4: δb := argmax
‖δ‖∞≤
max
k 6=yb
fk(xb+δ) (Eq. (4))
5: x˜b := xb + δb
6: λ(δb) := (1−min(1, ‖δb‖∞/))ρ (Eq. (6))
7: y˜b :=λ(δb) one hot(yb)+ (1−λ(δb)) 1K (Eq. (5))
8: end for
9: update parameters using Eq. (3):
10:
∑B/2
b=1 L(f(x˜b), y˜b) +
∑B
b=B/2 L(f(xb), yb)
11: end while
bations, unseen attacks or distal adversarial examples. This
allows to reject adversarial examples based on their low
confidence. We further enforce this behavior by explicitly
encouraging a “steep” transition from high-confidence pre-
dictions (on clean examples) to low-confidence predictions
(on adversarial examples). As result, the (low-confidence)
prediction is almost flat close to the boundary of the -ball.
Additionally, there is no incentive to deviate from the uni-
form distribution outside of the -ball. For example, as
illustrated in Fig. 2, the confidence stays low in between
examples from different classes and only increases if neces-
sary, i.e., close to the examples.
3.2. Confidence-Calibrated Adversarial Training
Confidence-calibrated adversarial training (CCAT) ad-
dresses these problems with minimal modifications, as out-
lined in Alg. 1. During training, we train the network to
predict a convex combination of (correct) one-hot distri-
bution on clean examples and uniform distribution on ad-
versarial examples as target distribution within the cross-
entropy loss. During testing, adversarial examples can be
rejected by confidence thresholding: adversarial examples
receive near-uniform confidence while test examples receive
high-confidence. By extrapolating the uniform distribution
beyond the -ball used during training, previously unseen
adversarial examples such as larger L∞ perturbations can be
rejected, as well. In the following, we first introduce an alter-
native objective for generating adversarial examples. Then,
we specifically define the target distribution, which becomes
more uniform with larger perturbations ‖δ‖∞. In Alg. 1,
these changes correspond to lines 4, 6 and 7, requiring only
few lines of code in practice.
Given an example x with label y, our adaptive attack during
training maximizes the confidence in any other label k 6= y.
This results in effective attacks against CCAT, as CCAT will
reject low-confidence adversarial examples:
max
‖δ‖∞≤
max
k 6=y
fk(x+ δ;w) (4)
Note that Eq. (2), in contrast, minimizes the confidence in
the true label y. Similarly, (Goodfellow et al., 2019) uses
targeted attacks in order to maximize confidence, whereas
ours is untargeted and, thus, our objective is the maximal
confidence over all other classes.
Then, given an adversarial example from Eq. (4) during
training, CCAT uses the following combination of uniform
and one-hot distribution as target for the cross-entropy loss:
y˜ = λ(δ) one hot(y) +
(
1− λ(δ)) 1
K
, (5)
with λ(δ) ∈ [0, 1] and one hot(y) ∈ {0, 1}K denoting the
one-hot vector corresponding to class y. Thus, we enforce
a convex combination of the original label distribution and
the uniform distribution which is controlled by the param-
eter λ = λ(δ), computed given the perturbation δ. We
choose λ to decrease with the distance ‖δ‖∞ of the adver-
sarial example to the attacked example x with the intention
to enforce uniform predictions when ‖δ‖∞ = . Then, the
network is encouraged to extrapolate this uniform distri-
bution beyond the used -ball. Even if extrapolation does
not work perfectly, the uniform distribution is much more
meaningful for extrapolation to arbitrary regions as well
as regions between classes compared to high-confidence
predictions as encouraged in standard adversarial training,
as demonstrated in Fig. 2. For controlling the trade-off λ
between one-hot and uniform distribution, we consider the
following “power transition”:
λ(δ) :=
(
1−min
(
1,
‖δ‖∞

))ρ
(6)
This ensures that for δ = 0 we impose the original (one-hot)
label. For growing δ, however, the influence of the original
label decays proportional to ‖δ‖∞. The speed of decay is
controlled by the parameter ρ. For ρ = 10, Fig. 1 (top right)
shows the transition as approximated by the network. The
power transition ensures that for ‖δ‖∞ ≥ , i.e., pertur-
bations larger than encountered during training, a uniform
distribution is enforced as λ is 0. We train on 50% clean and
50% adversarial examples in each batch, as in Eq. (3), such
that the network has an incentive to predict correct labels.
The convex combination of uniform and one-hot distribu-
tion in Eq. (5) resembles the label smoothing regularizer
introduced in (Szegedy et al., 2016). In concurrent work,
label smoothing has also been used as regularizer for adver-
sarial training (Cheng et al., 2020). However, in our case,
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λ = λ(δ) from Eq. (6) is not a fixed hyper-parameter as in
(Szegedy et al., 2016; Cheng et al., 2020). Instead, λ de-
pends on the perturbation δ and reaches zero for ‖δ‖∞ = 
to encourage low-confidence predictions beyond the -ball
used during training. Thereby, λ explicitly models the tran-
sition from one-hot to uniform distribution.
3.3. Confidence-Calibrated Adversarial Training
Results in Accurate Models
Proposition 2 discusses a problem where standard adversar-
ial training is unable to reconcile robustness and accuracy
while CCAT is able to obtain both robustness and accuracy:
Proposition 1. We consider a classification problem with
two points x = 0 and x =  in R with deterministic labels,
i.e., p(y = 2|x = 0) = 1 and p(y = 1|x = ) = 1,
such that the problem is fully determined by the probability
p0 = p(x = 0). The Bayes error of this classification
problem is zero. Let the predicted probability distribution
over classes be p˜(y|x) = egy(x)
eg1(x)+eg2(x)
, where g : Rd →
R2 is the classifier and we assume that the function λ :
R+ → [0, 1] used in CCAT is monotonically decreasing and
λ(0) = 1. Then, the error of the Bayes optimal classifier
(with cross-entropy loss) for
• adversarial training on 100% adversarial examples, cf.
Eq. (1), is min{p0, 1− p0}.
• adversarial training on 50%/50% adversarial/clean
examples per batch, cf. Eq. (3), is min{p0, 1− p0}.
• CCAT on 50% clean and 50% adversarial examples,
cf. Alg. 1, is zero if λ() < min {p0/1−p0, 1−p0/p0}.
Here, 100% and 50%/50% standard adversarial training are
unable to obtain both robustness and accuracy: The -ball
used during training contains examples of different classes
such that adversarial training enforces high-confidence pre-
dictions in contradicting classes. CCAT addresses this prob-
lem by encouraging low-confidence predictions on adver-
sarial examples within the -ball. Thus, CCAT is able to
improve accuracy while preserving robustness.
4. Detection and Robustness Evaluation with
Adaptive Attack
CCAT allows to reject (adversarial) inputs by confidence-
thresholding before classifying them. As we will see, this
“reject option”, is also beneficial for standard adversarial
training (AT). Thus, evaluation also requires two stages:
First, we fix the confidence threshold at 99% true positive
rate (TPR), where correctly classified clean examples are
positives such that at most 1% (correctly classified) clean
examples are rejected. Second, on the non-rejected exam-
ples, we evaluate accuracy and robustness using confidence-
thresholded (robust) test error.
4.1. Adaptive Attack
As CCAT encourages low confidence on adversarial exam-
ples, we use PGD to maximize the confidence of adversarial
examples, cf. Eq. (4), as effective adaptive attack against
CCAT. In order to effectively optimize our objective, we
introduce a simple but crucial improvement: after each iter-
ation, the computed update is only applied if the objective
is improved; otherwise the learning rate is reduced. Addi-
tionally, we use momentum (Dong et al., 2018) and run the
attack for exactly T iterations, choosing the perturbation
corresponding to the best objective across all iterations. In
addition to random initialization, we found that δ = 0 is
an effective initialization against CCAT. We applied the
same principles for (Ilyas et al., 2018), i.e., PGD with ap-
proximated gradients, Eq. (4) as objective, momentum and
backtracking; we also use Eq. (4) as objective for the black-
box attacks of (Andriushchenko et al., 2019; Narodytska &
Kasiviswanathan, 2017; Khoury & Hadfield-Menell, 2018).
4.2. Detection Evaluation
In the first stage, we consider a detection setting: adversarial
example are negatives and correctly classified clean exam-
ples are positives. The confidence threshold τ is chosen
extremely conservatively by requiring a 99% true positive
rate (TPR): at most 1% of correctly classified clean exam-
ples can be rejected. As result, the confidence threshold
is determined only by correctly classified clean examples,
independent of adversarial examples. Incorrectly rejecting
a significant fraction of correctly classified clean examples
is unacceptable. This is also the reason why we do not
report the area under the receiver operating characteristic
(ROC) curve as related work (Lee et al., 2018; Ma et al.,
2018). Instead, we consider the false positive rate (FPR).
The supplementary material includes a detailed discussion.
4.3. Robustness Evaluation
In the second stage, after confidence-thresholding, we con-
sider the widely used robust test error (RErr) (Madry et al.,
2018). It quantifies the model’s test error in the case where
all test examples are allowed to be attacked, i.e., modified
within the chosen threat model, e.g., for Lp:
“Standard” RErr =
1
N
N∑
n=1
max
‖δ‖p≤
1f(xn+δ)6=yn (7)
where {(xn, yn)}Nn=1 are test examples and labels. In prac-
tice, RErr is computed empirically using adversarial attacks.
Unfortunately, standard RErr does not take into account the
option of rejecting (adversarial) examples.
We propose a generalized definition adapted to our
confidence-thresholded setting where the model can reject
examples. For fixed confidence threshold τ at 99%TPR, the
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Figure 3: ROC and RErr Curves. On SVHN, we show
ROC curves when distinguishing correctly classified test ex-
amples from adversarial examples by confidence (left) and
(confidence-thresholded) RErr against confidence threshold
τ (right) for worst-case adversarial examples across L∞
attacks with  = 0.03. The confidence threshold τ is chosen
exclusively on correctly classified clean examples to obtain
99%TPR. For CCAT, this results in τ ≈ 0.6. Note that RErr
subsumes both Err and FPR.
confidence-thresholded RErr is defined as
RErr(τ) =
N∑
n=1
max
‖δ‖p≤,c(xn+δ)≥τ
1f(xn+δ) 6=yn
N∑
n=1
max
‖δ‖p≤
1c(xn+δ)≥τ
(8)
with c(x) = maxk fk(x) and f(x) being the model’s confi-
dence and predicted class on example x, respectively. Essen-
tially, this is the test error on test examples that can be
modified within the chosen threat model and pass con-
fidence thresholding. For τ = 0 (i.e., all examples pass
confidence thresholding) this reduces to the standard RErr,
comparable to related work. We stress that our adaptive at-
tack in Eq. (4) directly maximizes the numerator of Eq. (8)
by maximizing the confidence of classes not equal y. A
(clean) confidence-thresholded test error (Err(τ)) is ob-
tained similarly. In the following, if not stated otherwise,
we report confidence-thresholded RErr and Err as default
and omit the confidence threshold τ for brevity.
FPR and RErr: FPR quantifies how well an adversary
can perturb (correctly classified) examples while not being
rejected. The confidence-thresholded RErr is more conser-
vative as it measures any non-rejected error (adversarial
or not). As result, RErr implicitly includes FPR and Err.
Therefore, we report only RErr and include FPRs for all our
experiments in the supplementary material.
Per-Example Worst-Case Evaluation: Instead of report-
ing average or per-attack results, we use a per-example
worst-case evaluation scheme: For each individual test
example, all adversarial examples from all attacks (and
restarts) are accumulated. Subsequently, per test example,
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Figure 4: Confidence Histograms. On SVHN, for AT
(50%/50% adversarial training, left) and CCAT (right), we
show confidence histograms corresponding to correctly clas-
sified test examples (top) and adversarial examples (bottom).
We consider the worst-case adversarial examples across all
L∞ attacks for  = 0.03. While the confidence of adver-
sarial examples is reduced slightly for AT, CCAT is able
to distinguish the majority of adversarial examples from
(clean) test examples by confidence thresholding (in red).
only the adversarial example with highest confidence is
considered, resulting in a significantly stronger robustness
evaluation compared to related work.
5. Experiments
We evaluate CCAT in comparison with AT (Madry et al.,
2018) and related work (Maini et al., 2020; Zhang et al.,
2019) on MNIST (LeCun et al., 1998), SVHN (Netzer
et al., 2011) and Cifar10 (Krizhevsky, 2009) as well as
MNIST-C (Mu & Gilmer, 2019) and Cifar10-C (Hendrycks
& Dietterich, 2019b) with corrupted examples (e.g., blur,
noise, compression, transforms etc.). We report confidence-
thresholded test error (Err; ↓ lower is better) and
confidence-thresholded robust test error (RErr; ↓ lower
is better) for a confidence-threshold τ corresponding to
99% true positive rate (TPR); we omit τ for brevity. We
note that normal and standard adversarial training (AT) are
also allowed to reject examples by confidence thresholding.
Err is computed on 9000 test examples. RErr is computed
on 1000 test examples. The confidence threshold τ depends
only on correctly classified clean examples and is fixed at
99%TPR on the held-out last 1000 test examples.
Attacks: For thorough evaluation, we consider 7 different
Lp attacks for p ∈ {∞, 2, 1, 0}. As white-box attacks,
we use PGD to maximize the objectives Eq. (2) and (4),
referred to as PGD-CE and PGD-Conf. We use T = 1000
iterations and 10 random restarts with random initialization
plus one restart with zero initialization for PGD-Conf, and
T = 200 with 50 random restarts for PGD-CE. For L∞,
L2, L1 and L0 attacks, we set  to 0.3, 3, 18, 15 (MNIST)
or 0.03, 2, 24, 10 (SVHN/Cifar10).
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SVHN: RErr @99%TPR, L∞,  = 0.03
worst
case
top-5 attacks/restarts
out of 7 attacks with 84 restarts
AT-50% 56.0 52.1 52.0 51.9 51.6 51.4
CCAT 39.1 23.6 13.7 13.6 12.6 12.5
Table 1: Per-Example Worst-Case Evaluation. We com-
pare confidence-thresholded RErr with τ@99%TPR for
the per-example worst-case and the top-5 individual at-
tacks/restarts among 7 attacks with 84 restarts in total. Multi-
ple restarts are necessary to effectively attack CCAT, while a
single attack and restart is nearly sufficient against AT-50%.
This demonstrates that CCAT is more difficult to “crack”.
As black-box attacks, we additionally use the Query Limited
(QL) attack (Ilyas et al., 2018) adapted with momentum and
backtracking for T = 1000 iterations with 10 restarts, the
Simple attack (Narodytska & Kasiviswanathan, 2017) for
T = 1000 iterations and 10 restarts, and the Square attack
(L∞ and L2) (Andriushchenko et al., 2019) with T = 5000
iterations. In the case of L0 we also use Corner Search (CS)
(Croce & Hein, 2019). For all Lp, p ∈ {∞, 2, 1, 0}, we
consider 5000 (uniform) random samples from the Lp-ball
and the Geometry attack (Khoury & Hadfield-Menell, 2018).
Except for CS, all black-box attacks use Eq. (4) as objective:
Attack Objective T Restarts
PGD-CE Eq. (2), random init. 200 50
PGD-Conf Eq. (4), zero + random init. 1000 11
QL† Eq. (4), zero + random init. 1000 11
Simple† Eq. (4) 1000 10
Square† Eq. (4), L∞, L2 only 5000 1
CS† Eq. (2), L0 only 200 1
Geometry† Eq. (4) 1000 1
Random† Eq. (4) – 5000
† Black-box attacks.
Additionally, we consider adversarial frames and distal ad-
versarial examples: Adversarial frames (Zajac et al., 2019)
allow a 2 (MNIST) or 3 (SVHN/Cifar10) pixel border to be
manipulated arbitrarily within [0, 1] to maximize Eq. (4) us-
ing PGD. Distal adversarial examples start with a (uniform)
random image and use PGD to maximize (4) within a L∞-
ball of size  = 0.3 (MNIST) or  = 0.03 (SVHN/Cifar10).
Training: We train 50%/50% AT (AT-50%) and CCAT as
well as 100% AT (AT-100%) with L∞ attacks using T = 40
iterations for PGD-CE and PGD-Conf, respectively, and
 = 0.3 (MNIST) or  = 0.03 (SVHN/Cifar10). We
use ResNet-20 (He et al., 2016), implemented in PyTorch
(Paszke et al., 2017), trained using stochastic gradient de-
scent. For CCAT, we use ρ = 10.
Baselines: We compare to multi-steepest descent (MSD)
adversarial training (Maini et al., 2020) using the pre-trained
LeNet on MNIST and pre-activation ResNet-18 on Cifar10
trained with L∞, L2 and L1 adversarial examples and  set
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Figure 5: Backtracking. Our L∞ PGD-Conf attack, i.e.,
PGD maximizing Eq. (4), using 40 iterations with momen-
tum and our developed backtracking scheme (left) and with-
out both (right) on SVHN. We plot Eq. (4) over iterations
for the first 5 test examples corresponding to different colors.
Backtracking avoids oscillation and obtains higher overall
objective values within the same number of iterations.
to 0.3, 1.5, 12 and 0.03, 0.5, 12, respectively. The L2 and
L1 attacks in Tab. 2 (larger ) are unseen. For TRADES
(Zhang et al., 2019), we use the pre-trained convolutional
network (Carlini & Wagner, 2017b) on MNIST and WRN-
10-28 (Zagoruyko & Komodakis, 2016) on Cifar10, trained
on L∞ adversarial examples with  = 0.3 and  = 0.03,
respectively. On Cifar10, we further consider the pre-trained
ResNet-50 of (Madry et al., 2018) (AT-Madry, L∞ adver-
sarial examples with  = 0.03). We also consider the Ma-
halanobis (MAHA) (Lee et al., 2018) and local intrinsic
dimensionality (LID) detectors (Ma et al., 2018) using the
provided pre-trained ResNet-34 on SVHN/Cifar10.
5.1. Ablation Study
Evaluation Metrics: Fig. 3 shows ROC curves, i.e., how
well adversarial examples can be rejected by confidence. As
marked in red, we are only interested in the FPR for the
conservative choice of 99%TPR, yielding the confidence
threshold τ . The RErr curves highlight how robustness is
influenced by the threshold: AT also benefits from a reject
option, however, not as much as CCAT which has been
explicitly designed for rejecting adversarial examples.
Worst-Case Evaluation: Tab. 1 illustrates the importance
of worst-case evaluation on SVHN, showing that CCAT
is significantly “harder” to attack than AT. We show the
worst-case RErr over all L∞ attacks as well as the top-5
individual attacks (each restart treated as separate attack).
For AT-50%, a single restart of PGD-Conf with T = 1000
iterations is highly successful, with 52.1% RErr close to the
overall worst-case of 56%. For CCAT, in contrast, multiple
restarts are crucial as the best individual attack, PGD-Conf
with T = 1000 iterations and zero initialization obtains only
23.6% RErr compared to the overall worst-case of 39.1%.
Backtracking: Fig. 5 illustrates the advantage of backtrack-
ing for PGD-Conf with T=40 iterations on 5 test examples
of SVHN. Backtracking results in better objective values
and avoids oscillation, i.e., a stronger attack for training and
Confidence-Calibrated Adversarial Training
MNIST: Err ↓ in % confidence-thresholed RErr ↓ for τ@99%TPR
(clean)
τ = 0
(clean)
99%TPR
L∞
 = 0.3
L∞
 = 0.4
L2
 = 3
L1
 = 18
L0
 = 15
adv.
frames
(seen) (seen) seen unseen unseen unseen unseen unseen
Normal 0.4 0.1 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 92.3 87.7
AT-50% 0.5 0.0 1.7 100.0 81.5 24.6 23.9 73.7
AT-100% 0.5 0.0 1.7 100.0 84.8 21.3 13.9 62.3
CCAT 0.3 0.1 7.4 11.9 0.3 1.8 14.8 0.2
* MSD 1.8 0.9 34.3 98.9 59.2 55.9 66.4 8.8
* TRADES 0.5 0.1 4.0 99.9 44.3 9.0 35.5 0.2
FPR ↓
distal
unseen
100.0
100.0
100.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
Err ↓
corrupted
MNIST-C
unseen
32.8
12.6
17.6
5.7
6.0
7.9
SVHN: Err ↓ in % confidence-thresholed RErr ↓ for τ@99%TPR
(clean)
τ = 0
(clean)
99%TPR
L∞
 = 0.03
L∞
 = 0.06
L2
 = 2
L1
 = 24
L0
 = 10
adv.
frames
(seen) (seen) seen unseen unseen unseen unseen unseen
Normal 3.6 2.6 99.9 100.0 100.0 100.0 83.7 78.7
AT-50% 3.4 2.5 56.0 88.4 99.4 99.5 73.6 33.6
AT-100% 5.9 4.6 48.3 87.1 99.5 99.8 89.4 26.0
CCAT 2.9 2.1 39.1 53.1 29.0 31.7 3.5 3.7
* LID 3.3 2.2 91.0 93.1 92.2 90.0 41.6 89.8
* MAHA 3.3 2.2 73.0 79.5 78.1 67.5 41.5 9.9
FPR ↓
distal
unseen
87.1
86.3
81.0
0.0
8.6
0.0
CIFAR10: Err ↓ in % confidence-thresholed RErr ↓ for τ@99%TPR
(clean)
τ = 0
(clean)
99%TPR
L∞
 = 0.03
L∞
 = 0.06
L2
 = 2
L1
 = 24
L0
 = 10
adv.
frames
(seen) (seen) seen unseen unseen unseen unseen unseen
Normal 8.3 7.4 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 84.7 96.7
AT-50% 16.6 15.5 62.7 93.7 98.4 98.4 74.4 78.7
AT-100% 19.4 18.3 59.9 90.3 98.3 98.0 72.3 79.6
CCAT 10.1 6.7 68.4 92.4 52.2 58.8 23.0 66.1
* MSD 18.4 17.6 53.2 89.4 88.5 68.6 39.2 82.6
* TRADES 15.2 13.2 43.5 81.0 70.9 96.9 36.9 72.1
* AT-Madry 13.0 11.7 45.1 84.5 98.7 97.8 42.3 73.3
* LID 6.4 4.9 99.0 99.2 70.6 89.4 47.0 66.1
* MAHA 6.4 4.9 94.1 95.3 90.6 97.6 49.8 70.0
FPR ↓
distal
unseen
83.3
75.0
72.5
0.0
76.7
76.2
78.5
0.1
2.4
Err ↓
corrupted
CIFAR10-C
unseen
12.3
16.2
19.6
8.5
19.3
15.0
12.9
11.59
12.4
Table 2: Main Results: Generalizing Robustness. For L∞, L2, L1, L0 attacks and adversarial frames, we report per-
example worst-case (confidence-thresholded) Err and RErr at 99%TPR across all attacks;  is reported in the corresponding
columns. For distal adversarial examples and corrupted examples, we report FPR and Err, respectively. L∞ attacks with
=0.3 on MNIST and  = 0.03 on SVHN/Cifar10 were used for training (seen). The remaining attacks were not encountered
during training (unseen). CCAT outperforms AT and the other baselines regarding robustness against unseen attacks. FPRs
included in the supplementary material. * Pre-trained models with different architecture, LID/MAHA use the same model.
testing. In addition, while T=200 iterations are sufficient
against AT, we needed up to T=1000 iterations for CCAT.
5.2. Main Results (Table 2)
Robustness Against seen L∞ Attacks: Considering
Tab. 2 and L∞ adversarial examples as seen during train-
ing, CCAT exhibits comparable robustness to AT. With
7.4%/67.9% RErr on MNIST/Cifar10, CCAT lacks behind
AT-50% (1.7%/62.7%) only slightly. On SVHN, in contrast
CCAT outperforms AT-50% and AT-100% significantly
with 39.1% vs. 56.0% and 48.3%. We note that CCAT
and AT-50% are trained on 50% clean / 50% adversarial
examples. This is in contrast to AT-100% trained on 100%
adversarial examples, which improves robustness slightly,
e.g., from 56%/62.7% to 48.3%/59.9% on SVHN/Cifar10.
Robustness Against unseen Lp Attacks: Regarding un-
seen attacks, AT’s robustness deteriorates quickly while
CCAT is able to generalize robustness to novel threat mod-
els. On SVHN, for example, RErr of AT-50% goes up to
88.4%, 99.4%, 99.5% and 73.6% for largerL∞, L2, L1 and
L0 attacks. In contrast, CCAT’s robustness generalizes to
these unseen attacks significantly better, with 53.1%, 29%,
31.7% and 3.5%, respectively. The results on MNIST and
Cifar10 or for AT-100% tell a similar story. However, AT
generalizes better to L1 and L0 attacks on MNIST, possi-
bly due to the large L∞-ball used during training ( = 0.3).
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Here, training purely on adversarial examples, i.e., AT-100%
is beneficial. On Cifar10, CCAT has more difficulties with
large L∞ attacks ( = 0.06) with 92% RErr. As detailed
in the supplementary material, these observations are sup-
ported by considering FPR. AT benefits from considering
FPR as clean Err is not taken into account. On Cifar10, for
example, 47.6% FPR compared to 62.7% RErr for AT-50%.
This is less pronounced for CCAT due to the improved
Err compared to AT. Overall, CCAT improves robustness
against arbitrary (unseen) Lp attacks, demonstrating that
CCAT indeed extrapolates near-uniform predictions beyond
the L∞ -ball used during training.
Comparison to MSD and TRADES: TRADES is able to
outperform CCAT alongside AT (including AT-Madry) on
Cifar10 with respect to the L∞ adversarial examples seen
during training: 43.5% RErr compared to 68.4% for CCAT.
This might be a result of training on 100% adversarial ex-
amples and using more complex models: TRADES uses
a WRN-10-28 with roughly 46.1M weighs, in contrast to
our ResNet-18 with 4.3M (and ResNet-20 with 11.1M for
MSD). However, regarding unseen L2, L1 and L0 attacks,
CCAT outperforms TRADES with 52.2%, 58.8% and 23%
compared to 70.9%, 96.9% and 36.9% in terms of RErr.
Similarly, CCAT outperforms MSD. This is surprising, as
MSD trains on both L2 and L1 attacks with smaller , while
CCAT does not. Only against larger L∞ adversarial exam-
ples with  = 0.06, TRADES reduces RErr from 92.4%
(CCAT) to 81%. Similar to AT, TRADES also generalizes
better to L2, L1 or L0 on MNIST, while MSD is not able to
compete. Overall, compared to MSD and TRADES, the ro-
bustness obtained by CCAT generalizes better to previously
unseen attacks. We also note that, on MNIST, CCAT out-
performs the robust Analysis-by-Synthesis (ABS) approach
of (Schott et al., 2019) wrt. L∞, L2, and L0 attacks.
Detection Baselines: The detection methods LID and
MAHA are outperformed by CCAT across all datasets and
threat models. On SVHN, for example, MAHA obtains
73% RErr against the seen L∞ attacks and 79.5%, 78.1%,
67.5% and 41.5% RErr for the unseen L∞, L2, L1 and
L0 attacks. LID is consistently outperformed by MAHA
on SVHN. This is striking, as we only used PGD-CE and
PGD-Conf to attack these approaches and emphasizes the
importance of training adversarially against an adaptive
attack to successfully reject adversarial examples.
Robustness Against Unconventional Attacks: Against
adversarial frames, robustness of AT reduces to 73.7%
/62.3% RErr (AT-50%/100%), even on MNIST, while
CCAT achieves 0.2%. MSD, in contrast, is able to pre-
serve robustness better with 8.8% RErr, which might be due
to the L2 and L1 attacks seen during training. CCAT outper-
forms both approaches with 0.2% RErr, as does TRADES.
On SVHN and Cifar10, however, CCAT outperforms all
approaches, including TRADES, considering adversarial
frames. Against distal adversarial examples, CCAT outper-
forms all approaches significantly, with 0% FPR, compared
to the second-best of 72.5% for AT-100% on Cifar10. Only
the detection baselines LID and MAHA are competitive,
reaching close to 0% FPR. This means that CCAT is able
to extrapolate low-confidence distributions to far-away re-
gions of the input space. Finally, we consider corrupted
examples (e.g., blur, noise, transforms etc.) where CCAT
also improves results, i.e., mean Err across all corruptions.
On Cifar10-C, for example, CCAT achieves 8.5% compared
12.9% for AT-Madry and 12.3% for normal training. On
MNIST-C, only MSD yields a comparably low Err: 6% vs.
5.7% for CCAT.
Improved Test Error: CCAT also outperforms AT re-
garding Err, coming close to that of normal training. On
all datasets, confidence-thresholded Err for CCAT is bet-
ter or equal than that of normal training. On Cifar10,
only LID/MAHA achieve a better standard and confidence-
thresholded Err using a ResNet-34 compared to our ResNet-
20 for CCAT (21.2M vs. 4.3M weights). In total the perfor-
mance of CCAT shows that the robustness-generalization
trade-off can be improved significantly.
Our supplementary material includes detailed descrip-
tions of our PGD-Conf attack (including pseudo-code), a
discussion of our confidence-thresholded RErr, and more
details regarding baselines. We also include results for con-
fidence thresholds at 98% and 95%TPR, which improves
results only slightly, at the cost of “throwing away” sig-
nificantly more clean examples. Furthermore, we provide
ablation studies, qualitative examples and per-attack results.
6. Conclusion
Adversarial training results in robust models against the
threat model seen during training, e.g., L∞ adversarial ex-
amples. However, generalization to unseen attacks such as
other Lp adversarial examples or larger L∞ perturbations is
insufficient. We propose confidence-calibrated adversar-
ial training (CCAT) which biases the model towards low
confidence predictions on adversarial examples and beyond.
Then, adversarial examples can easily be rejected based on
their confidence. Trained exclusively on L∞ adversarial
examples, CCAT improves robustness against unseen threat
models such as larger L∞, L2, L1 and L0 adversarial ex-
amples, adversarial frames, distal adversarial examples and
corrupted examples. Additionally, accuracy is improved in
comparison to adversarial training. We thoroughly evaluated
CCAT using 7 different white-and black-box attacks with
up to 50 random restarts and 5000 iterations. These attacks
where adapted to CCAT by directly maximizing confidence.
We reported worst-case robust test error, extended to our
confidence-thresholded setting, across all attacks.
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Supplementary Material for
Confidence-Calibrated Adversarial Training: Generalizing to Unseen Attacks
Abstract
This document provides supplementary material for confidence-calibrated adversarial training (CCAT). First,
in Sec. B, we provide the proof of Proposition 1, showing that there exist problems where standard adversarial
training (AT) is unable to reconcile robustness and accuracy, while CCAT is able to obtain both robustness
and accuracy. In Sec. C, to promote reproducibility and emphasize our thorough evaluation, we discuss details
regarding the used attacks, training procedure, baselines and evaluation metrics. Furthermore, Sec. C includes
additional experimental results in support of the observations in the main paper. For example, we present results
for confidence threshold at 95% and 98% true positive rate (TPR), results for the evaluated detection baselines as
well as per-attack and per-corruption results for in-depth analysis. We also include qualitative results highlighting
how CCAT obtains robustness through confidence thresholding. Code and pre-trained models are available at
davidstutz.de/ccat.
A. Introduction
Confidence-calibrated adversarial training (CCAT) biases the network towards low-confidence predictions on adversarial
examples. This is achieved by training the network to predict a uniform distribution between (correct) one-hot and uniform
distribution which becomes more uniform as the distance to the attacked example increases. In the main paper, we show that
CCAT addresses two problems of standard adversarial training (AT) as, e.g., proposed in (Madry et al., 2018): the poor
generalization of robustness to attacks not employed during training, e.g., other Lp attacks or larger perturbations, and the
reduced accuracy. We show that CCAT, trained only on L∞ adversarial examples, improves robustness against previously
unseen attacks through confidence thresholding, i.e., rejecting low-confidence (adversarial) examples. Furthermore, we
demonstrate that CCAT is able to improve accuracy compared to adversarial training. In this document, Sec. B provides
the proof of Proposition 1. Then, Sec. C includes details on our experimental setup, emphasizing our efforts to thoroughly
evaluate CCAT, and additional experimental results allowing an in-depth analysis of the robustness obtained through CCAT.
In Sec. B, corresponding to the proof of Proposition 1, we show that there exist problems where standard adversarial training
is indeed unable to reconcile robustness and accuracy. CCAT, in contrast, is able to obtain both robustness and accuracy,
given that the “transition” between one-hot and uniform distribution used during training is chosen appropriately.
In Sec. C, we discuss our thorough experimental setup to facilitate reproducibility and present additional experimental
results in support of the conclusions of the main paper. In the first part of Sec. C, starting with Sec. C.1, we provide a
detailed description of the employed projected gradient descent (PGD) attack with momentum and backtracking, including
pseudo-code and used hyper-parameters. Similarly, we discuss details of the used black-box attacks. In Sec. C.2, we include
details on our training procedure, especially for CCAT. In Sec. C.3, we discuss the evaluated baselines, i.e., (Maini et al.,
2020; Madry et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2019; Lee et al., 2018; Ma et al., 2018). Then, in Sec. C.4, we discuss the employed
evaluation metrics, focusing on our confidence-thresholded robust test error (RErr). In the second part of Sec. C, starting
with Sec. C.5, we perform ablation studies considering our attack and CCAT. Regarding the attack, we demonstrate the
importance of enough iterations, backtracking and appropriate initialization to successfully attack CCAT. Regarding CCAT,
we consider various values for the hyper-parameter ρ which controls the transition from one-hot to uniform distribution
during training. In Sec. C.6, we analyze how CCAT achieves robustness by considering its behavior in adversarial directions
as well as in between clean examples. Finally, we provide additional experimental results in Sec. C.7: our main results,
i.e., robustness against seen and unseen adversarial examples, for a confidence threshold at 95% and 98% true positive
rate (TPR), per-attack results on all datasets and per-corruption results on MNIST-C (Mu & Gilmer, 2019) and Cifar10-C
(Hendrycks & Dietterich, 2019a).
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B. Proof of Proposition 1
Adversarial training usually results in reduced accuracy on clean examples. In practice, training on 50% clean and 50%
adversarial examples instead of training only on adversarial examples allows to control the robustness-accuracy trade-off to
some extent, i.e., increase accuracy while sacrificing robustness. The following proposition shows that there exist problems
where adversarial training is unable to reconcile robustness and accuracy, while CCAT is able to obtain both:
Proposition 2. We consider a classification problem with two points x = 0 and x =  in R with deterministic labels,
i.e., p(y = 2|x = 0) = 1 and p(y = 1|x = ) = 1, such that the problem is fully determined by the probability
p0 = p(x = 0). The Bayes error of this classification problem is zero. Let the predicted probability distribution over classes
be p˜(y|x) = egy(x)
eg1(x)+eg2(x)
, where g : Rd → R2 is the classifier and we assume that the function λ : R+ → [0, 1] used in
CCAT is monotonically decreasing and λ(0) = 1. Then, the error of the Bayes optimal classifier (with cross-entropy loss)
for
• adversarial training on 100% adversarial examples is min{p0, 1− p0}.
• adversarial training on 50%/50% adversarial/clean examples per batch is min{p0, 1− p0}.
• CCAT on 50% clean and 50% adversarial examples is zero if λ() < min {p0/1−p0, 1−p0/p0}.
Proof. First, we stress that we are dealing with three different probability distributions over the labels: the true one p(y|x),
the imposed one during training pˆ(y|x) and the predicted one p˜(y|x). We also note that pˆ depends on λ as follows:
pˆ(k) = λpy(k) + (1− λ)u(k) (9)
where py(k) is the original one-hot distribution, i.e., py(k) = 1 iff k = y and py(k) = 0 otherwise with y being the true
label, and u(k) = 1/K is the uniform distribution. We note that this is merely an alternative formulation to the target
distribution as outlined in the main paper. Also note that λ itself is a function of the norm ‖δ‖; here, this dependence is
made explicit by writing pˆ(λ)(y|x). This makes the expressions for the expected loss of CCAT slightly more complicated.
We first derive the Bayes optimal classifier and its loss for CCAT. We introduce
a = g1(0)− g2(0), b = g1()− g2(). (10)
and express the logarithm of the predicted probabilities (confidences) of class 1 and 2 in terms of these quantities.
− log p˜(y = 2|x = x) = − log
( eg2(x)
eg1(x) + eg2(x)
)
= log
(
1 + eg1(x)−g2(x)
)
=
{
log
(
1 + ea
)
if x = 0
log(1 + eb) if x = 
.
− log p˜(y = 1|x = x) = − log
( eg1(x)
eg1(x) + eg2(x)
)
= log
(
1 + eg2(x)−g1(x)
)
=
{
log(1 + e−a) if x = 0
log
(
1 + e−b
)
if x = 
.
We consider the approach by (Madry et al., 2018) with 100% adversarial training. The expected loss can be written as
E
[
max‖δ‖∞≤ L(y, g(x+ δ)
]
= E
[
E
[
max‖δ‖∞≤ L(y, g(x+ δ)|x
]]
=p(x = 0)p(y = 2|x = 0)max{− log (p˜(y = 2|x = 0)),− log (p˜(y = 2|x = ))}
+ (1− p(x = 0))p(y = 1|x = )max{− log (p˜(y = 1|x = 0)),− log (p˜(y = 1|x = ))}
=p(x = 0)max
{− log (p˜(y = 2|x = 0)),− log (p˜(y = 2|x = ))}
+ (1− p(x = 0))max{− log (p˜(y = 1|x = 0)),− log (p˜(y = 1|x = )}
This yields in terms of the parameters a, b the expected loss:
L(a, b) =max
{
log(1 + ea), log(1 + eb)
}
p0 +max
{
log(1 + e−a), log(1 + e−b)
}
(1− p0)
The expected loss is minimized if a = b as then both maxima are minimal. This results in the expected loss
L(a) = log(1 + ea)p0 + log(1 + e
−a)(1− p0).
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The critical point is attained at a∗ = b∗ = log
(
1−p0
p0
)
. Thus
a∗ = b∗ =
{
> 0 if p0 < 12 ,
< 0 if p0 > 12 .
Thus, we classify x = 0 correctly, if p0 > 12 and x =  correctly if p0 <
1
2 . As result, the error of 100% adversarial training
is given by min{p0, 1− p0} whereas the Bayes optimal error is zero as the problem is deterministic.
Next we consider 50% adversarial plus 50% clean training. The expected loss
E
[
max‖δ‖∞≤ L(y, g(x+ δ)
]
+ E
[
L(y, g(x+ δ)
]
,
can be written as
L(a, b) =max
{
log(1 + ea), log(1 + eb)
}
p0
+max
{
log(1 + e−a), log(1 + e−b)
}
(1− p0)
+ log(1 + ea)p0 + log(1 + e
−b)(1− p0)
We make a case distinction. If a ≥ b, then the loss reduces to
L(a, b) = log(1 + ea)p0 + log(1 + e
−b)(1− p0)
+ log(1 + ea)p0 + log(1 + e
−b)(1− p0)
≥ L(a, a)
= 2 log(1 + ea)p0 + 2 log(1 + e
−a)(1− p0)
Solving for the critical point yields a∗ = log
(
1−p0
p0
)
= b∗. Next we consider the set a ≤ b. This yields the loss
L(a, b) = log(1 + eb)p0 + log(1 + e
−a)(1− p0)
+ log(1 + ea)p0 + log(1 + e
−b)(1− p0)
Solving for the critical point yields a∗ = log
(
1−p0
p0
)
= b∗ which fulfills a ≤ b. Actually, it coincides with the solution
found already for 100% adversarial training and thus resulting error of 50% adversarial, 50% clean training is again
min{p0, 1− p0} which is not equal to the Bayes optimal error.
For our confidence-calibrated adversarial training one first has to solve
δ∗x(j) = argmax
‖δ‖∞≤
max
k 6=j
p˜(y = k |x+ δ).
We get with the expressions above (note that we have a binary classification problem):
δ∗0(1) = argmax
‖δ‖∞≤
p˜(y = 2|0 + δ) =
{
0 if a < b
 else.
.
δ∗0(2) = argmax
‖δ‖∞≤
p˜(y = 1|0 + δ) =
{
 if a < b
0 else.
.
δ∗ (1) = argmax
‖δ‖∞≤
p˜(y = 2|+ δ) =
{
− if a < b
0 else.
.
δ∗ (2) = argmax
‖δ‖∞≤
p˜(y = 1|+ δ) =
{
0 if a < b
− else. .
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Note that the imposed distribution pˆ over the classes depends on the true label y of x and δ∗x(y) and then λ(‖δ∗x(y)‖∞). Due
to the simple structure of the problem it holds that ‖δ∗x(y)‖∞ is either 0 or .
In CCAT we use for 50% of the batch the standard cross-entropy loss and for the other 50% we use the following loss:
L
(
pˆy
(
λ
( ‖δ∗x(y)‖ ))(x), p˜(x)) = − 2∑
j=1
pˆy
(
λ
( ‖δ∗x(y)‖ ))(y = j |x = x) log (p˜(y = j |x = x+ δ∗x(j))) .
The corresponding expected loss is then given by
E
[
L
(
pˆy
(
λ
( ‖δ∗x(y)‖ ))(x), p˜(x))] = E[E[L(pˆy(λ( ‖δ∗x(y)‖ ))(x), p˜(x))∣∣∣x]]
=p(x = 0)E
[
L
(
pˆy
(
λ
( ‖δ∗0(y)‖ ))(0), p˜(0))∣∣∣x = 0]+ p(x = )E[L(pˆY (λ( ‖δ∗ (y)‖ ))(), p˜())∣∣∣x = ],
where p(x = 0) = p0 and p(x = ) = 1− p(x = 0) = 1− p0. With the true conditional probabilities p(y = s |x) we get
E
[
L
(
pˆy
(
λ(δ)
)
(x), p˜(x)
)∣∣∣x] = 2∑
s=1
p(y = s |x)L
(
pˆs
(
λ
( ‖δ∗x(s)‖ ))(x), p˜(x))
=−
2∑
s=1
p(y = s |x)
2∑
j=1
pˆs
(
λ
( ‖δ∗x(s)‖ ))(y = j |x) log (p˜(y = j |x = x+ δ∗x(s)))
For our problem it holds with p(y = 2 |x = 0) = p(y = 1 |x = ) = 1 (by assumption). Thus,
E
[
L
(
pˆy
(
λ(δ)
)
(x), p˜(x)
)∣∣∣x = 0] = − 2∑
j=1
pˆ2
(
λ
( ‖δ∗0(2)‖ ))(y = j |x = 0) log (p˜(y = j |x = x+ δ∗0(2)))
E
[
L
(
pˆy
(
λ(δ)
)
(x), p˜(x))
∣∣∣x = ] = − 2∑
j=1
pˆ1
(
λ
( ‖δ∗ (1)‖ ))(y = j |x = ) log (p˜(y = j |x = x+ δ∗ (1)))
As ‖δ∗x(y)‖∞ is either 0 or  and λ(0) = 1 we use in the following for simplicity the notation λ = λ(‖‖∞). Moreover,
note that
pˆy(λ)(y = j|x = x) =
{
λ+ (1−λ)K if y = j,
(1−λ)
K else
,
where K is the number of classes. Thus, K = 2 in our example and we note that λ+ (1−λ)2 =
1+λ
2 .
With this we can write the total loss (remember that we have half normal cross-entropy loss and half the loss for the
adversarial part with the modified “labels”) as
L(a, b) =p0
[
log(1 + ea)1a≥b + 1a<b
( (1 + λ)
2
log(1 + eb) +
(1− λ)
2
log(1 + e−b)
)]
+ (1− p0)
[
log(1 + e−b)1a≥b + 1a<b
( (1 + λ)
2
log(1 + e−a) +
(1− λ)
2
log(1 + ea)
)]
+ log(1 + ea)p0 + log(1 + e
−b)(1− p0),
where we have omitted a global factor 12 for better readability (the last row is the cross-entropy loss). We distinguish two sets
in the optimization. First we consider the case a ≥ b. Then it is easy to see that in order to minimize the loss we have a = b.
∂aL = 2
ea
1 + ea
p0 − e
−a
1 + e−a
(1− p0)
This yields ea = 1−p0p0 or a = log
(
1−p0
p0
)
and the minimum for a ≥ b is attained on the boundary of the domain of a ≤ b.
The other case is a ≤ b. We get
∂aL =
[ (1 + λ)
2
−e−a
1 + e−a
+
(1− λ)
2
ea
1 + ea
]
(1− p0) + p0 e
a
1 + ea
∂bL =
[ (1 + λ)
2
eb
1 + eb
+
(1− λ)
2
−eb
1 + e−b
]
p0 + (1− p0) −e
−b
1 + e−b
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This yields the solution
a∗ = log
(
1+λ
2 (1− p0)
p0 +
1−λ
2 (1− p0)
)
, b∗ = log
(
1−λ
2 p0 + (1− p0)
1+λ
2 p0
)
It is straightforward to check that a∗ < b∗ for all 0 < p0 < 1, indeed we have
1+λ
2 (1− p0)
p0 +
1−λ
2 (1− p0)
=
1+λ
2 (1− p0)
p0
1+λ
2 +
1−λ
2
=
1− p0 − (1−λ)2 (1− p0)
p0
1+λ
2 +
1−λ
2
<
1−λ
2 p0 + (1− p0)
1+λ
2 p0
if 0 < p0 < 1 and note that λ < 1 by assumption. We have a∗ < 0 and thus g2(0) > g1(0) (Bayes optimal decision for
x = 0) if
1 >
1− p0
p0
λ,
and b∗ > 0 and thus g1() > g2() (Bayes optimal decision for x = ) if
1 >
p0
1− p0λ.
Thus we recover the Bayes classifier if
λ < min
{1− p0
p0
,
p0
1− p0
}
.
C. Experiments
In the following, we provide additional details on our experimental setup regarding (a) the used attacks, especially our
PGD-Conf attack including pseudo-code in Sec. C.1, (b) training of AT and CCAT in Sec. C.2, (c) the evaluated baselines in
Sec. C.3 and (d) the used evaluation metrics in Sec. C.4. Afterwards, we include additional experimental results, including
ablation studies in Sec. C.5, qualitative results for analysis in Sec. C.6, and further results for 95% and 98% true positive
rate (TPR), results per attack and results per corruption on MNIST-C (Mu & Gilmer, 2019) and Cifar10-C (Hendrycks &
Dietterich, 2019a) in Sec. C.7.
C.1. Attacks
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD): Complementary to the description of the projected gradient descent (PGD) attack by
(Madry et al., 2018) and our adapted attack, we provide a detailed algorithm in Alg. 2. We note that the objective maximized
in (Madry et al., 2018) is
F(x+ δ, y) = L(f(x+ δ;w), y) (11)
where L denotes the cross-entropy loss, f(·;w) denotes the model and (x, y) is an input-label pair from the test set. Our
adapted attack, in contrast, maximizes
F(x+ δ, y) = maxk 6=y fk(x+ δ;w) (12)
where fk denotes the confidence of f in class k. Note that the maximum over labels, i.e., maxk 6=y, is explicitly computed
during optimization; this means that in contrast to (Goodfellow et al., 2019), we do not run (K − 1) targeted attacks
and subsequently take the maximum-confidence one, where K is the number of classes. We denote these two variants as
PGD-CE and PGD-Conf, respectively. Deviating from (Madry et al., 2018), we initialize δ uniformly over directions and
norm (instead of uniform initialization over the volume of the -ball):
δ = u
δ′
‖δ′‖∞ , δ
′ ∼ N (0, I), u ∼ U(0, 1) (13)
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Algorithm 2 Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) with Backtracking. Pseudo-code for the used PGD procedure to
maximize Eq. (11) or Eq. (12) using momentum and backtracking subject to the constraints x˜i = xi + δi ∈ [0, 1] and
‖δ‖∞ ≤ ; in practice, the procedure is applied on batches of inputs. The algorithm is easily adapted to work with arbitrary
Lp-norm; only the projections on Line 6 and 24 as well as the normalized gradient in Line 10 need to be adapted.
input: example x with label y
input: number of iterations T
input: learning rate γ, momentum β, learning rate factor α
input: initial δ(0), e.g., Eq. (13) or δ(0) = 0
1: v := 0 {saves the best objective achieved}
2: x˜ := x+ δ(0) {best adversarial example obtained}
3: g(−1) := 0 {accumulated gradients}
4: for t = 0, . . . , T do
5: {projection onto L∞ -ball and on [0, 1]:}
6: clip δ(t)i to [−, ]
7: clip xi + δ
(t)
i to [0, 1]
8: {forward and backward pass to get objective and gradient:}
9: v(t) := F(x+ δ(t), y) {see Eq. (11) or Eq. (12)}
10: g(t) := sign
(
∇δ(t)F(x+ δ(t), y)
)
11: {keep track of adversarial example resulting in best objective:}
12: if v(t) > v then
13: v := v(t)
14: x˜ := x+ δ(t)
15: end if
16: {iteration T is only meant to check whether last update improved objective:}
17: if t = T then
18: break
19: end if
20: {integrate momentum term:}
21: g(t) := βg(t−1) + (1− β)g(t)
22: {“try” the update step and see if objective increases:}
23: δˆ(t) := δ(t) + γg(t)
24: clip δˆ(t)i to [−, ]
25: clip xi + δˆ
(t)
i to [0, 1]
26: vˆ(t) := F(x+ δˆ(t), y)
27: {only keep the update if the objective increased; otherwise decrease learning rate:}
28: if vˆ(t) ≥ v(t) then
29: δ(t+1) := δˆ(t)
30: else
31: γ := γ/α
32: end if
33: end for
34: return x˜, v˜
where δ′ is sampled from a standard Gaussian and u ∈ [0, 1] from a uniform distribution. We also consider zero initialization,
i.e., δ = 0. For random initialization we always consider multiple restarts, 10 for PGD-Conf and 50 for PGD-CE; for zero
initialization, we use 1 restart. Finally, in contrast to (Madry et al., 2018), we run PGD for exactly T iterations, taking the
perturbation corresponding to the best objective value obtained throughout the optimization.
PGD for Lp, p ∈ {0, 1, 2}: Both PGD-CE and PGD-Conf can also be applied using the L2, L1 and L0 norms following
the description above. Then, gradient normalization in Line 10 of Alg. 2, the projection in Line 6, and the initialization in
Eq. (13) need to be adapted. For the L2 norm, the gradient is normalized by dividing by the L2 norm; for the L1 norm only
the 1% largest values (in absolute terms) of the gradient are kept and normalized by their L1 norm; and for the L0 norm, the
gradient is normalized by dividing by the L1 norm. We follow the algorithm of (Duchi et al., 2008) for the L1 projection;
for the L0 projection (onto the -ball for  ∈ N0), only the  largest values are kept. Similarly, initialization for L2 and L1
are simple by randomly choosing a direction (as in Eq. (13)) and then normalizing by their norm. For L0, we randomly
choose pixels with probability ( 23)/(HWD) and set them to a uniformly random values u ∈ [0, 1], where H ×W ×D is
the image size. In experiments, we found that tuning the learning rate for PGD with L1 and L0 constraints (independent of
Confidence-Calibrated Adversarial Training
MNIST: Attack Ablation with confidence-thresholded RErr in % for τ@99%TPR
(L∞ attack with  = 0.3 for training and testing)
Optimization momentum+backtrack mom –
Initialization zero rand zero zero
Iterations 40 200 1000 2000 2000 60 300 60 300
AT 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.4
AT Conf (AT trained with PGD-Conf) 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0
CCAT 0.2 1.4 4.6 4.6 3.7 0.7 0.7 0.2 0.2
SVHN: Attack Ablation with confidence-thresholded RErr in % for τ@99%TPR
(L∞ attack with  = 0.03 for training and testing)
Optimization momentum+backtrack mom –
Initialization zero rand zero zero
Iterations 40 200 1000 2000 2000 60 300 60 300
AT 38.4 46.2 49.9 50.1 51.8 37.7 38.1 29.9 30.8
AT Conf (AT trained with PGD-Conf) 27.4 40.5 46.9 47.3 48.1 27.1 28.5 21.1 23.8
CCAT 4.0 5.0 22.8 23.3 5.2 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6
CIFAR10: Attack Ablation with confidence-thresholded RErr in % for τ@99%TPR
(L∞ attack with  = 0.03 for training and testing)
Optimization momentum+backtrack mom –
Initialization zero rand zero zero
Iterations 40 200 1000 2000 2000 60 300 60 300
AT 60.9 60.8 60.8 60.8 60.9 60.9 60.9 57.4 57.6
AT Conf (AT trained with PGD-Conf) 60.4 60.6 60.5 60.5 60.9 60.4 60.6 56.2 56.6
CCAT 14.8 16.2 40.2 41.3 34.9 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2
Table 3: Detailed Attack Ablation Studies. We compare our L∞ PGD-Conf attack with T iterations and different
combinations of momentum, backtracking and initialization on all three datasets. We consider AT, AT trained with PGD-
Conf (AT Conf), and CCAT; we report RErr for confidence threshold τ@99%TPR. As backtracking requires an additional
forward pass per iteration, we use T = 60 and T = 300 for attacks without backtracking to be comparable to attacks with
T = 40 and T = 200 with backtracking. Against CCAT, T = 1000 iterations or more are required and backtracking
is essential to achieve high RErr. AT, in contrast, is “easier” to attack, requiring less iterations and less sophisticated
optimization (i.e., without momentum and/or backtracking).
the objective, i.e., Eq. (11) or Eq. (12)) is much more difficult. Additionally, PGD using the L0 norm seems to get easily
stuck in sub-optimal local optima.
Backtracking: Alg. 2 also gives more details on the employed momentum and backtracking scheme. These two “tricks”
add two additional hyper-parameters to the number of iterations T and the learning rate γ, namely the momentum parameter
β and the learning rate factor α. After each iteration, the computed update, already including the momentum term, is only
applied if this improves the objective. This is checked through an additional forward pass. If not, the learning rate is divided
by α, and the update is rejected. Alg. 2 includes this scheme as an algorithm for an individual test example x with label y
for brevity; however, extending it to work on batches is straight-forward. However, it is important to note that the learning
rate is updated per test example individually. In practice, for PGD-CE, with T = 200 iterations, we use γ = 0.05, β = 0.9
and α = 1.25; for PGD-Conf, with T = 1000 iterations, we use γ = 0.001, β = 0.9 and α = 1.1.
Black-Box Attacks: We also give more details on the used black-box attacks. For random sampling, we apply Eq. (13)
T = 5000 times. We also implemented the Query-Limited (QL) black-box attack of (Ilyas et al., 2018) using a population
of 50 and variance of 0.1 for estimating the gradient in Line 10 of Alg. 2; a detailed algorithm is provided in (Ilyas et al.,
2018). We use a learning rate of 0.001 (note that the gradient is signed, as in (Madry et al., 2018)) and also integrated a
momentum with β = 0.9 and backtracking with α = 1.1 and T = 1000 iterations. We use zero and random initialization;
in the latter case we allow 10 random restarts. For the Simple black-box attack we follow the algorithmic description in
(Narodytska & Kasiviswanathan, 2017) considering only axis-aligned perturbations of size  per pixel. We run the attack
for T = 1000 iterations and allow 10 random restarts. Following, (Khoury & Hadfield-Menell, 2018), we further use
the Geometry attack for T = 1000 iterations. Random sampling, QL, Simple and Geometry attacks are run for arbitrary
Lp, p ∈ {∞, 2, 1, 0}. For L∞, we also use the Square attack proposed in (Andriushchenko et al., 2019) with T = 5000
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SVHN: Training Ablation for Detection (τ@99%TPR) and Standard Settings (τ = 0)
(L∞ attack with  = 0.03 during training and testing)
Detection Setting
τ@99%TPR
Standard Setting
τ = 0
ROC
AUC
Err
in %
RErr
in %
Err
in %
RErr
in %
Normal 0.17 2.6 99.9 3.6 99.9
AT 0.55 2.5 54.9 3.4 56.9
AT Conf (AT trained with PGD-Conf) 0.61 2.8 52.5 3.7 58.7
CCAT, ρ = 1 0.74 2.2 43.0 2.7 82.4
CCAT, ρ = 2 0.68 2.1 44.2 2.9 79.6
CCAT, ρ = 4 0.68 1.8 35.8 2.7 80.4
CCAT, ρ = 6 0.64 1.8 32.8 2.9 72.1
CCAT, ρ = 8 0.63 2.2 42.3 2.9 84.6
CCAT, ρ = 10 0.67 2.1 38.5 2.9 91.0
CCAT, ρ = 12 0.67 1.9 36.3 2.8 81.8
CIFAR10: Training Ablation for Detection (τ@99%TPR) and Standard Settings (τ = 0)
(L∞ attack with  = 0.03 during training and testing)
Detection Setting
τ@99%TPR
Standard Setting
τ = 0
ROC
AUC
Err
in %
RErr
in %
Err
in %
RErr
in %
Normal 0.20 7.4 100.0 8.3 100.0
AT 0.65 15.1 60.9 16.6 61.3
AT Conf (AT trained with PGD-Conf) 0.63 15.1 61.5 16.1 61.7
CCAT, ρ = 1 0.63 8.7 72.4 9.7 95.3
CCAT, ρ = 2 0.60 8.4 70.6 9.7 95.1
CCAT, ρ = 4 0.61 8.6 66.3 9.8 93.5
CCAT, ρ = 6 0.54 8.0 69.8 9.2 94.1
CCAT, ρ = 8 0.58 8.5 65.3 9.4 93.2
CCAT, ρ = 10 0.60 8.7 63.0 10.1 95.0
CCAT, ρ = 12 0.62 9.4 63.0 10.1 96.6
Table 4: Training Ablation Studies. We report unthresholded RErr and Err, i.e., τ = 0 (“Standard Setting”), and
τ@99%TPR as well as ROC AUC (“Detection Setting”) for CCAT with various values for ρ. The models are tested against
our L∞ PGD-Conf attack with T = 1000 iterations and zero as well as random initialization. On Cifar10, ρ = 10 works
best and performance stagnates for ρ > 10. On SVHN, we also use ρ = 10, although ρ = 6 shows better results.
iterations with a probability of change of 0.05. For all attacks, we use Eq. (12) as objective. Finally, for L0, we also use
Corner Search (Croce & Hein, 2019) with the cross-entropy loss as objective, for T = 200 iterations. We emphasize that,
except for QL, these attacks are not gradient-based and do not approximate the gradient. Furthermore, we note that all
attacks except Corner Search are adapted to explicitly attack CCAT by maximizing Eq. (12).
C.2. Training
We follow the ResNet-20 architecture by (He et al., 2016) implemented in PyTorch (Paszke et al., 2017). For training
we use a batch size of 100 and train for 100 and 200 epochs on MNIST and SVHN/Cifar10, respectively: this holds for
normal training, adversarial training (AT) and confidence-calibrated adversarial training (CCAT). For the latter two, we use
PGD-CE and PGD Conf, respectively, for T = 40 iterations including momentum and backtracking (β = 0.9, α = 1.5).
For PGD-CE we use a learning rate of 0.05, 0.01 and 0.005 on MNIST, SVHN and Cifar10. For PGD-Conf we use a
learning rate of 0.005. For CCAT, we randomly switch between the initialization in Eq. (13) and zero initialization. For
training, we use standard stochastic gradient descent, starting with a learning rate of 0.1 on MNIST/SVHN and 0.075 on
Cifar10. The learning rate is multiplied by 0.95 after each epoch. We do not use weight decay; but the network includes
batch normalization (Ioffe & Szegedy, 2015). On SVHN and Cifar10, we use random cropping, random flipping (only
Cifar10) and contrast augmentation during training. We always train on 50% clean and 50% adversarial examples per batch,
i.e., each batch contains both clean and adversarial examples which is important when using batch normalization.
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Figure 6: Confidence Histograms. We show histograms of confidences on correctly classified test examples (top) and on
adversarial examples (bottom) for both AT and CCAT. Note that for AT, the number of successful adversarial examples is
usually lower than for CCAT. For CCAT in contrast, nearly all adversarial examples are successful, while only a part has
high confidence. Histograms obtained for the worst-case adversarial examples across all tested L∞ attacks with  = 0.3 and
 = 0.03 on MNIST and Cifar10, respectively.
C.3. Baselines
As baseline, we use the multi-steepest descent (MSD) adversarial training of (Maini et al., 2020), using the code and models
provided in the official repository1. The models correspond to a LeNet-like (LeCun et al., 1998) architecture on MNIST,
and the pre-activation version of ResNet-18 (He et al., 2016) on Cifar10. The models were trained with L∞, L2 and L1
adversarial examples and  set to 0.3, 1.5, 12 and 0.03, 0.5, 12, respectively. We attacked these models using the same setup
as used for standard AT and our CCAT.
Additionally, we compare to TRADES (Zhang et al., 2019) using the code and pre-trained models from the official
repository2. The models correspond to a convolutional architecture with four convolutional and three fully-connected layers
(Carlini & Wagner, 2017b) on MNIST, and a wide ResNet, specifically WRN-10-28 (Zagoruyko & Komodakis, 2016), on
Cifar10. Both are trained using only L∞ adversarial examples with  = 0.3 and  = 0.03, respectively. The evaluation
protocol follows the same setup as used for standard AT and CCAT.
On Cifar10, we also use the pre-trained ResNet-50 from (Madry et al., 2018) obtained from the official repository3. The
model was trained on L∞ adversarial examples with  = 0.03. The same evaluation as for CCAT applies.
Furthermore, we evaluate two detection baseline: the Mahalanobis detector (MAHA) of (Ma et al., 2018) and the local
intrinsic dimensionality (LID) detector of (Lee et al., 2018). We used the code provided by (Lee et al., 2018) from the official
repository4. For evaluation, we used the provided setup, adding only PGD-CE and PGD-Conf with T = 1000, T = 200
and T = 40. For T = 1000, we used 5 random restarts, for T = 200, we used 25 restarts, and for T = 40, we used one
restart. These were run for L∞, L2, L1 and L0. We also evaluated distal adversarial examples as in the main paper. While
the hyper-parameters were chosen considering our L∞ PGD-CE attack (T = 40, one restart) and kept fixed for other threat
models, the logistic regression classifier trained on the computed statistics (e.g., the Mahalanobis statistics) is trained for
each threat model individually, resulting in an advantage over AT and CCAT. For worst-case evaluation, where we keep
the highest-confidence adversarial example per test example for CCAT, we use the obtained detection score instead. This
means, for each test example individually, we consider the adversarial example with worst detection score for evaluation.
1https://github.com/locuslab/robust_union
2https://github.com/yaodongyu/TRADES
3https://github.com/MadryLab/robustness
4https://github.com/pokaxpoka/deep_Mahalanobis_detector
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Figure 7: ROC and RErr curves. ROC curves, i.e. FPR plotted against TPR for all possible confidence thresholds τ ,
and (confidence-thresholded) RErr curves, i.e., RErr over confidence threshold τ for AT and CCAT, including different ρ
parameters. Worst-case adversarial examples across all L∞ attacks with  = 0.3 (MNIST) and  = 0.03 (Cifar10) were
tested. For evaluation, the confidence threshold τ is fixed at 99%TPR, allowing to reject at most 1% correctly classified
clean examples. Thus, we also do not report the area under the ROC curve in the main paper.
C.4. Evaluation Metrics
Complementing the discussion in the main paper, we describe the used evaluation metrics and evaluation procedure in
more detail. Adversarial examples are computed on the first 1000 examples of the test set; the used confidence threshold is
computed on the last 1000 examples of the test set; test errors are computed on all test examples minus the last 1000. As we
consider multiple attacks, and some attacks allow multiple random restarts, we always consider the worst case adversarial
example per test example and across all attacks/restarts; the worst-case is selected based on confidence.
FPR and ROC AUC: To compute receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves, and the area under the curve, i.e., ROC
AUC, we define negatives as successful adversarial examples (corresponding to correctly classified test examples) and
positives as the corresponding correctly classified test examples. The ROC AUC as well as the curve itself can easily be
calculated using scikit-learn (Pedregosa et al., 2011). Practically, the generated curve could be used to directly estimate
a threshold corresponding to a pre-determined true positive rate (TPR). However, this requires interpolation; after trying
several interpolation schemes, we concluded that the results are distorted significantly, especially for TPRs close to 100%.
Thus, we follow a simpler scheme: on a held out validation set of size 1000 (the last 1000 samples of the test set), we sorted
the corresponding confidences, and picked the confidence threshold in order to obtain (at least) the desired TPR, e.g., 99%.
In the main paper, instead of reporting ROC AUC, we reported only confidence-thresholded robust test error (RErr), which
implicitly subsumes the false positive rate (FPR), at a confidence threshold of 99%TPR. Again, we note that this is an
extremely conservative choice, allowing to reject at most 1% correctly classified clean examples. In addition, comparison to
other approaches is fair as the corresponding confidence threshold only depends on correctly classified clean examples, not
on adversarial examples. As also seen in Fig. 7, ROC AUC is not a practical metric to evaluate the detection/rejection of
adversarial examples. This is because rejecting a significant part of correctly classified clean examples is not acceptable.
In this sense, ROC AUC measures how well positives and negatives can be distinguished in general, while we are only
interested in the performance for very high TPR, e.g., 99%TPR as in the main paper. In this document, we also report FPR
to complement our evaluation using (confidence-thresholded) RErr.
Robust Test Error: The standard robust test error (Madry et al., 2018) is the model’s test error in the case where all test
examples are allowed to be attacked, i.e., modified within the chosen threat model, e.g., for Lp:
“Standard” RErr =
1
N
N∑
n=1
max
‖δ‖p≤
1f(xn+δ) 6=yn (14)
where {(xn, yn)}Nn=1 are test examples and labels. In practice, RErr is computed empirically using several adversarial
attacks, potentially with multiple restarts as the inner maximization problem is generally non-convex.
As standard RErr does not account for a reject option, we propose a generalized definition adapted to our confidence-
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SVHN: CCAT with L∞ PGD-Conf,  = 0.03 for training and testing
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Cifar10: AT with L∞ PGD-Conf,  = 0.03 for training and testing
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Cifar10: CCAT with L∞ PGD-Conf,  = 0.03 for training and testing
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Figure 8: Effect of Confidence Calibration. Confidences for classes along adversarial directions for AT and CCAT.
Adversarial examples were computed using PGD-Conf with T = 1000 iterations and zero initialization. For both AT and
CCAT, we show the first ten examples of the test set on SVHN, and the first five examples of the test set on Cifar10. As can
be seen, CCAT biases the network to predict uniform distributions beyond the -ball used during training ( = 0.03). For
AT, in contrast, adversarial examples can usually be found right beyond the -ball.
thresholded setting. For fixed confidence threshold τ , e.g., at 99%TPR, the confidence-thresholded RErr is defined as
RErr(τ) =
N∑
n=1
max
‖δ‖p≤,c(xn+δ)≥τ
1f(xn+δ) 6=yn
N∑
n=1
max
‖δ‖p≤
1c(xn+δ)≥τ
(15)
with c(x) = maxk fk(x) and f(x) being the model’s confidence and predicted class on example x, respectively. This is the
test error on test examples that can be modified within the chosen threat model and pass confidence thresholding. It reduces
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MNIST: CCAT with L∞ PGD-Conf,  = 0.3 for training
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Figure 9: Confidence Calibration Between Test Examples. We plot the confidence for all classes when interpolating
linearly between test examples: (1− κ)x1 + κx2 for two test examples x1 and x2 with κ ∈ [0, 1]; x1 is fixed and we show
two examples corresponding to different x2. Additionally, we show the corresponding images for κ = 0, i.e., x1, κ = 0.5,
i.e., the mean image, and κ = 1, i.e., x2, with the corresponding labels and confidences. As can be seen, CCAT is able
to perfectly predict a uniform distribution between test examples. AT, in contrast, enforces high-confidence predictions,
resulting in conflicts if x1 and x2 are too close together (i.e., within one -ball) or in sudden changes of the predicted class
in between, as seen above.
to standard RErr for τ = 0, is in [0, 1] and, thus, fully comparable to related work.
As both Eq. (14) and Eq. (15) cannot be computed exactly, we compute∑N
n=1max{1f(xn)6=yn1c(xn)≥τ ,1f(x˜n)6=yn1c(x˜n)≥τ}∑N
n=1max{1c(xn)≥τ ,1c(x˜n)≥τ}
(16)
which is an upper bound assuming that our attack is perfect. Essentially, this counts the test examples xn that are either
classified incorrectly with confidence c(xn) ≥ τ or that can be attacked successfully x˜n = xn + δ with confidence
c(x˜n) ≥ τ . This is normalized by the total number of test examples xn that have c(xn) ≥ τ or where the corresponding
adversarial example x˜n has c(x˜n) ≥ τ . It can easily be seen that τ = 0 reduces Eq. (16) to its unthresholded variant, i.e.,
standard RErr, ensuring full comparability to related work.
In the following, we also highlight two special cases that are (correctly) taken into account by Eq. (16): (a) if a correctly
classified test example xn, i.e., f(xn) = yn, has confidence c(xn) < τ , i.e., is rejected, but the corresponding adversarial
example x˜n with f(x˜n) 6= y has c(x˜n) ≥ τ , i.e., is not rejected, this is counted both in the numerator and denominator; (b)
if an incorrectly classified test example xn, i.e., f(xn) 6= y, with c(xn) < τ , i.e., rejected, has a corresponding adversarial
example x˜n, i.e., also f(x˜n) 6= y, but with x(xn) ≥ τ , i.e., not rejected, this is also counted in the numerator as well as
denominator. Note that these cases are handled differently in our detection evaluation following related work (Ma et al.,
2018; Lee et al., 2018): negatives are adversarial examples corresponding to correctly classified clean examples that are
successful, i.e., change the label. For example, case (b) would not contribute towards the FPR since the original test example
is already mis-classified. Thus, while RErr implicitly includes FPR as well as Err, it is even more conservative than just
considering “FPR + Err”.
C.5. Ablation Study
In the following, we include ablation studies for our attack PGD-Conf, in Tab. 3, and for CCAT, in Tab. 4.
Attack. Regarding the proposed attack PGD-Conf using momentum and backtracking, Tab. 3 shows that backtracking
and sufficient iterations are essential to attack CCAT. On SVHN, for AT, the difference in RErr between T = 200 and
T = 1000 iterations is only 3.7%, specifically, 46.2% and 49.9%. For CCAT, in contrast, using T = 200 iterations is not
sufficient, with merely 5% RErr. However, T = 1000 iterations with zero initialization increases RErr to 22.8%. For more
iterations, i.e., T = 2000, RErr stagnates with 23.3%. When using random initialization (one restart), RErr drops to 5.2%,
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MNIST: FPR and RErr in % for τ@99%TPR
L∞
 = 0.3
L∞
 = 0.4
L2
 = 3
L1
 = 18
L0
 = 15
adv.
frames
seen unseen unseen unseen unseen unseen
FPR↓ RErr ↓ FPR↓ RErr ↓ FPR↓ RErr ↓ FPR↓ RErr ↓ FPR↓ RErr ↓ FPR↓ RErr ↓
Normal 99.3 100.0 99.3 100.0 99.3 100.0 99.3 100.0 91.6 92.3 87.0 87.7
AT-50% 1.0 1.7 99.3 100.0 80.7 81.5 23.8 24.6 23.0 23.9 72.9 73.7
AT-100% 1.0 1.7 99.2 100.0 83.9 84.8 20.2 21.3 12.9 13.9 61.3 62.3
CCAT 6.9 7.4 11.4 11.9 0.0 0.3 1.3 1.8 14.2 14.8 0.0 0.2
* MSD 32.1 34.3 96.7 98.9 57.0 59.2 53.7 55.9 64.2 66.4 6.6 8.8
* TRADES 3.4 4.0 99.3 99.9 43.6 44.3 8.2 9.0 34.6 35.5 0.0 0.2
SVHN: FPR and RErr in % for τ@99%TPR
L∞
 = 0.03
L∞
 = 0.06
L2
 = 2
L1
 = 24
L0
 = 10
adv.
frames
seen unseen unseen unseen unseen unseen
FPR↓ RErr ↓ FPR↓ RErr ↓ FPR↓ RErr ↓ FPR↓ RErr ↓ FPR↓ RErr ↓ FPR↓ RErr ↓
Normal 95.8 99.9 95.9 100.0 95.9 100.0 95.9 100.0 79.6 83.7 74.6 78.7
AT-50% 52.3 56.0 84.7 88.4 95.7 99.4 95.8 99.5 70.0 73.6 30.0 33.6
AT-100% 42.1 48.3 80.9 87.1 93.3 99.5 93.6 99.8 83.1 89.4 19.9 26.0
CCAT 35.5 39.1 49.5 53.1 25.4 29.0 28.1 31.7 0.4 3.5 1.0 3.7
* LID 87.1 91 89.2 93.1 96.1 92.2 85.7 90 37.6 41.6 85.1 89.8
* MAHA 68.6 73 75.2 79.5 73.2 78.1 63.2 67.5 36.9 41.5 6.3 9.9
CIFAR10: FPR and RErr in % for τ@99%TPR
L∞
 = 0.03
L∞
 = 0.06
L2
 = 2
L1
 = 24
L0
 = 10
adv.
frames
seen unseen unseen unseen unseen unseen
FPR↓ RErr ↓ FPR↓ RErr ↓ FPR↓ RErr ↓ FPR↓ RErr ↓ FPR↓ RErr ↓ FPR↓ RErr ↓
Normal 93.0 100.0 93.0 100.0 93.0 100.0 93.0 100.0 77.7 84.7 89.7 96.7
AT-50% 47.6 62.7 78.6 93.7 83.3 98.4 83.3 98.4 59.3 74.4 63.6 78.7
AT-100% 42.3 59.9 72.7 90.3 80.7 98.3 80.4 98.0 54.7 72.3 62.0 79.6
CCAT 59.9 68.4 83.9 92.4 43.7 52.2 50.3 58.8 14.4 23.0 57.4 66.1
* MSD 35.3 53.2 71.5 89.4 70.6 88.5 50.7 68.6 21.4 39.2 64.7 82.6
* TRADES 28.9 43.5 66.4 81.0 56.3 70.9 82.3 96.9 22.3 36.9 57.5 72.1
* AT-Madry 33.8 45.1 73.2 84.5 87.4 98.7 86.5 97.8 31.0 42.3 62.0 73.3
* LID 92.7 99 92.9 99.2 64 70.6 82.9 89.4 40.6 47 59.9 66.1
* MAHA 87.7 94.1 89 95.3 84.2 90.6 91.3 97.6 43.5 49.8 64.1 70
Table 5: Main Results: FPR for 99%TPR. For 99%TPR, we report confidence-thresholded RErr and FPR for the results
from the main paper. We emphasize that only PGD-CE and PGD-Conf were used against LID and MAHA. In general, the
observations of the main paper can be confirmed considering FPR. Due to the poor Err of AT, MSD or TRADES on Cifar10,
these methods benefit most from considering FPR instead of (confidence-thresholded) RErr. * Pre-trained models with
different architectures.
even when using T = 2000 iterations. Similar significant drops are observed without backtracking. These observations
generalize to MNIST and Cifar10.
Training: Tab. 4 reports results for CCAT with different values for ρ. We note that ρ controls the (speed of the) transi-
tion from (correct) one-hot distribution to uniform distribution depending on the distance of adversarial example to the
corresponding original training example. Here, higher ρ results in a sharper (i.e., faster) transition from one-hot to uniform
distribution. It is also important to note that the power transition does not preserve a bias towards the true label, i.e., for the
maximum possible perturbation (‖δ‖∞ = ), the network is forced to predict a purely uniform distribution. As can be seen,
both on SVHN and Cifar10, higher ρ usually results in better robustness. Thus, for the main paper, we chose ρ = 10. Only
on SVHN, ρ = 6 of ρ = 12 perform slightly better. However, we found that ρ = 10 generalizes better to previously unseen
attacks.
Confidence-Calibrated Adversarial Training
MNIST: FPR and confidence-thresholded RErr in % for τ@98%TPR
L∞
 = 0.3
L∞
 = 0.4
L2
 = 3
L1
 = 18
L0
 = 15
adv.
frames
seen unseen unseen unseen unseen unseen
FPR↓ RErr ↓ FPR↓ RErr ↓ FPR↓ RErr ↓ FPR↓ RErr ↓ FPR↓ RErr ↓ FPR↓ RErr ↓
Normal 99.3 100.0 99.3 100.0 99.3 100.0 99.3 100.0 87.3 88.1 79.8 80.5
AT-50% 0.5 0.8 99.3 100.0 66.7 67.9 16.3 17.5 16.1 17.2 61.3 62.5
AT-100% 0.6 1.3 99.2 100.0 77.3 78.3 16.9 18.0 9.2 10.2 52.6 53.7
CCAT 5.2 5.7 8.8 9.3 0.0 0.2 0.6 0.9 7.6 8.1 0.0 0.1
* MSD 28.8 31.0 96.6 98.8 53.9 56.2 51.3 53.5 61.5 63.7 4.4 6.6
* TRADES 1.2 1.9 99.1 99.7 31.6 32.6 4.3 5.1 28.0 29.7 0.0 0.1
distal
unseen
FPR↓
100.0
100.0
100.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
corr.
MNIST-C
unseen
Err ↓
31.0
12.3
15.4
5.3
5.6
5.7
SVHN: FPR and confidence-thresholded RErr in % for τ@98%TPR
L∞
 = 0.03
L∞
 = 0.06
L2
 = 2
L1
 = 24
L0
 = 10
adv.
frames
seen unseen unseen unseen unseen unseen
FPR↓ RErr ↓ FPR↓ RErr ↓ FPR↓ RErr ↓ FPR↓ RErr ↓ FPR↓ RErr ↓ FPR↓ RErr ↓
Normal 95.7 99.8 95.9 100.0 95.9 100.0 95.9 100.0 72.7 76.8 72.4 76.5
AT-50% 50.0 53.7 83.4 87.1 95.5 99.2 95.7 99.4 54.0 57.9 26.8 30.6
AT-100% 42.1 48.3 80.9 87.1 93.3 99.5 93.6 99.8 82.2 88.8 19.3 25.1
CCAT 34.0 37.6 40.5 44.1 20.3 23.9 25.0 28.6 0.2 2.6 0.1 2.2
distal
unseen
FPR↓
87.1
86.3
81.0
0.0
CIFAR10: FPR and confidence-thresholded RErr in % for τ@98%TPR
L∞
 = 0.03
L∞
 = 0.06
L2
 = 2
L1
 = 24
L0
 = 10
adv.
frames
seen unseen unseen unseen unseen unseen
FPR↓ RErr ↓ FPR↓ RErr ↓ FPR↓ RErr ↓ FPR↓ RErr ↓ FPR↓ RErr ↓ FPR↓ RErr ↓
Normal 93.0 100.0 93.0 100.0 93.0 100.0 93.0 100.0 70.1 77.1 89.6 96.6
AT-50% 47.6 62.7 78.6 93.7 83.3 98.4 83.3 98.4 57.2 72.4 63.6 78.7
AT-100% 42.1 59.7 72.7 90.3 80.7 98.3 80.4 98.0 52.1 70.0 62.0 79.6
CCAT 59.4 67.9 83.5 92.0 43.3 51.8 50.0 58.5 11.7 20.3 56.4 65.1
* MSD 35.1 53.0 71.5 89.4 69.9 87.8 50.6 68.5 17.8 35.8 64.7 82.6
* TRADES 28.9 43.5 66.4 81.0 56.2 70.8 82.3 96.9 21.9 36.4 57.4 72.0
* AT-Madry 33.6 44.9 73.2 84.5 87.4 98.7 86.5 97.8 30.8 42.0 61.9 73.2
corr.
unseen
FPR↓
83.3
75.0
72.5
0.0
76.7
76.2
78.5
corr.
CIFAR10-C
unseen
Err ↓
11.4
15.1
17.8
8.1
17.1
14.1
11.4
Table 6: Main Results: Generalizable Robustness for 98%TPR. While reporting results for 99%TPR in the main paper,
reducing the TPR requirement for confidence-thresholding to 98%TPR generally improves results, but only slightly. We
report FPR and confidence-thresholded RErr for 98%TPR. For MNIST-C and Cifar10-C, we report mean Err across all
corruptions. L∞ attacks with =0.3 on MNIST and  = 0.03 on SVHN/Cifar10 were used for training (seen). All other
attacks were not used during training (unseen). * Pre-trained models with different architectures.
C.6. Analysis
Confidence Histograms: For further analysis, Fig. 6 shows confidence histograms for AT and CCAT on MNIST and
Cifar10. The confidence histograms for CCAT reflect the expected behavior: adversarial examples are mostly successful in
changing the label, which is supported by high RErr values for confidence threshold τ = 0, but their confidence is pushed
towards uniform distributions. For AT, in contrast, successful adversarial examples – fewer in total – generally obtain high
confidence. As a result, while confidence thresholding generally benefits AT, the improvement is not as significant as for
CCAT.
Confidence Along Adversarial Directions: In Fig. 8, we plot the probabilities for all ten classes along an adversarial
direction. We note that these directions do not necessarily correspond to successful or high-confidence adversarial examples.
Instead, we chose the first 10 test examples on SVHN and Cifar10. The adversarial examples were obtained using our L∞
PGD-Conf attack with T = 1000 iterations and zero initialization for  = 0.03. For AT, we usually observe a change in
predictions along these directions; some occur within ‖δ‖∞ ≤ , corresponding to successful adversarial examples (within
), some occur for ‖δ‖∞ > , corresponding to unsuccessful adversarial examples (within ). However, AT always assigns
high confidence. Thus, when allowing larger adversarial perturbations at test time, robustness of AT reduces significantly.
For CCAT, in contrast, there are only few such cases; more often, the model achieves a near uniform prediction for small
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MNIST: FPR and confidence-thresholded RErr in % for τ@95%TPR
L∞
 = 0.3
L∞
 = 0.4
L2
 = 3
L1
 = 18
L0
 = 15
adv.
frames
seen unseen unseen unseen unseen unseen
FPR↓ RErr ↓ FPR↓ RErr ↓ FPR↓ RErr ↓ FPR↓ RErr ↓ FPR↓ RErr ↓ FPR↓ RErr ↓
Normal 99.3 100.0 99.3 100.0 99.3 100.0 99.0 99.7 75.6 76.7 65.9 67.0
AT-50% 0.2 0.4 99.3 100.0 54.6 56.7 12.3 13.7 11.1 12.3 47.3 49.2
AT-100% 0.2 0.9 99.2 100.0 63.9 65.6 10.7 12.4 3.6 4.4 35.0 37.2
CCAT 3.1 3.7 5.7 6.3 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 2.0 2.2 0.0 0.1
* MSD 22.0 24.6 95.0 97.2 44.0 46.8 42.1 44.6 54.5 57.3 2.3 4.4
* TRADES 0.6 1.0 98.1 98.8 16.5 18.3 2.1 2.7 21.4 24.0 0.0 0.0
distal
unseen
FPR↓
100.0
100.0
100.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
corr.
MNIST-C
unseen
Err ↓
27.5
8.6
10.5
5.5
4.4
3.2
SVHN: FPR and confidence-thresholded RErr in % for τ@95%TPR
L∞
 = 0.03
L∞
 = 0.06
L2
 = 2
L1
 = 24
L0
 = 10
adv.
frames
seen unseen unseen unseen unseen unseen
FPR↓ RErr ↓ FPR↓ RErr ↓ FPR↓ RErr ↓ FPR↓ RErr ↓ FPR↓ RErr ↓ FPR↓ RErr ↓
Normal 95.6 99.7 95.9 100.0 95.9 100.0 95.9 100.0 65.3 69.5 66.8 71.1
AT-50% 45.5 49.2 79.7 83.4 95.4 99.1 95.5 99.2 34.8 38.9 21.5 25.5
AT-100% 40.5 46.9 80.9 87.1 93.3 99.5 93.6 99.8 78.5 85.5 15.9 21.7
CCAT 32.8 36.5 38.6 42.2 16.5 20.3 21.1 24.9 0.0 1.2 0.0 1.2
distal
unseen
FPR↓
87.1
59.3
75.1
0.0
CIFAR10: FPR and confidence-thresholded RErr in % for τ@95%TPR
L∞
 = 0.03
L∞
 = 0.06
L2
 = 2
L1
 = 24
L0
 = 10
adv.
frames
seen unseen unseen unseen unseen unseen
FPR↓ RErr ↓ FPR↓ RErr ↓ FPR↓ RErr ↓ FPR↓ RErr ↓ FPR↓ RErr ↓ FPR↓ RErr ↓
Normal 93.0 100.0 93.0 100.0 93.0 100.0 93.0 100.0 52.0 59.0 88.8 95.9
AT-50% 46.6 61.7 78.6 93.7 83.3 98.4 83.3 98.4 43.9 59.6 62.8 77.9
AT-100% 41.3 59.1 72.7 90.3 80.6 98.2 80.4 98.0 47.2 65.3 62.0 79.7
CCAT 57.4 66.0 80.8 89.3 39.7 48.2 48.9 57.4 3.6 11.1 50.8 59.7
* MSD 32.8 50.9 71.5 89.4 67.7 85.6 49.1 67.3 11.4 28.4 64.2 82.2
* TRADES 26.5 41.3 66.1 80.7 53.9 68.5 82.3 96.9 17.6 32.0 56.4 71.1
* AT-Madry 32.4 43.9 73.2 84.5 87.4 98.7 86.5 97.8 28.6 40.1 61.5 72.8
corr.
unseen
FPR↓
83.3
75.0
72.5
0.0
76.7
76.2
78.5
corr.
CIFAR10-C
unseen
Err ↓
7.7
12.1
15.6
6.0
13.7
10.7
9.1
Table 7: Main Results: Generalizable Robustness for 95%TPR. We report FPR and RErr for 95%TPR, in comparison
with 98% in Tab. 6 and 99% in the main paper. For MNIST-C and Cifar10-C, we report mean Err across all corruptions.
L∞ attacks with =0.3 on MNIST and  = 0.03 on SVHN/Cifar10 seen during training; all other attacks unseen during
training. Results improve slightly in comparison with 98%TPR. However, the improvements are rather small and do not
justify the significantly increased fraction of “thrown away” (correctly classified) clean examples. * Pre-trained models with
different architectures.
‖δ‖∞ and extrapolates this behavior beyond the -ball used for training. On SVHN, this behavior successfully allows to
generalize the robustness to larger adversarial perturbations. Furthermore, these plots illustrate why using more iterations
at test time, and using techniques such as momentum and backtracking, are necessary to find adversarial examples as the
objective becomes more complex compared to AT.
Confidence Along Interpolation: In Fig. 9, on MNIST, we additionally illustrate the advantage of CCAT with respect to
the toy example in Proposition 2. Here, we consider the case where the -balls of two training or test examples (in different
classes) overlap. As we show in Proposition 2, adversarial training is not able to handle such cases, resulting in the trade-off
between accuracy in robustness reported in the literature (Tsipras et al., 2018; Stutz et al., 2019; Raghunathan et al., 2019;
Zhang et al., 2019). This is because adversarial training enforces high-confidence predictions on both -balls (corresponding
to different classes), resulting in an obvious conflict. CCAT, in contrast, enforces uniform predictions throughout the largest
parts of both -balls, resolving the conflict.
Confidence-Calibrated Adversarial Training
MNIST:
all
unseen
FPR↓ RErr ↓
Normal 99.3 100.0
AT-50% 99.3 100.0
AT-100% 99.2 100.0
CCAT 23.4 23.9
* MSD 97.0 99.2
* TRADES 99.3 99.9
* AT-Madry – –
SVHN:
all
unseen
FPR↓ RErr ↓
95.9 100.0
96.2 99.9
93.7 99.9
57.5 61.1
– –
– –
– –
CIFAR10:
all
unseen
FPR↓ RErr ↓
93.0 100.0
84.1 99.2
81.0 98.6
86.3 94.8
76.2 94.1
82.8 97.4
87.6 98.9
CIFAR10:
unseen
except L∞
with =0.06
FPR↓ RErr ↓
93.0 100.0
84.1 99.2
81.1 98.7
69.1 77.6
75.6 93.5
82.7 97.3
87.6 98.9
Table 8: Worst-Case Results Across Unseen Attacks. We report the (per-example) worst-case, confidence-thresholded
RErr and FPR across all unseen attacks on MNIST, SVHN and Cifar10. On Cifar10, we additionally present results for all
attacks except L∞ adversarial examples with larger  = 0.06 (indicated in blue). CCAT is able to outperform all baselines,
including MSD and TRADES, significantly on MNIST and SVHN. On Cifar10, CCAT performs poorly on L∞ adversarial
examples with larger  = 0.06. However, excluding these adversarial examples, CCAT also outperforms all baselines on
Cifar10. * Pre-trained models with different architectures.
C.7. Results
Main Results for 98% and 95% TPR: Tab. 6 reports our main results requiring only 98%TPR; Tab. 7 shows results for
95%TPR. This implies, that compared to 99%TPR, up to 1% (or 4%) more correctly classified test examples can be rejected,
increasing the confidence threshold and potentially improving robustness. For relatively simple tasks such as MNIST and
SVHN, where Err is low, this is a significant “sacrifice”. However, as can be seen, robustness in terms of RErr only improves
slightly. We found that the same holds for 95%TPR, however, rejecting more than 2% of correctly classified examples seems
prohibitive large for the considered datasets.
Worst-Case Across Unseen Attacks: Tab. 8 reports per-example worst-case RErr and FPR for 99%TPR considering all
unseen attacks. On MNIST and SVHN, RErr increases to nearly 100% for AT, both AT-50% and AT-100%. CCAT, in
contrast, is able to achieve considerably lower RErr: 23.9% on MNIST and 61.1% on SVHN. Only on Cifar10, CCAT
does not result in a significant improvement; all methods, including related work such as MSD and TRADES yield RErr of
94% or higher. However, this is mainly due to the poor performance of CCAT against large L∞ adversarial examples with
 = 0.06. Excluding these adversarial examples (right most table, indicated in blue) shows that RErr improves to 77.6% for
CCAT, while RErr for the remaining methods remains nearly unchanged. Overall, these experiments emphasize that CCAT
is able to generalize robustness to previously unseen attacks.
Per-Attack Results: In Tab. 9 to 19, we break down our main results regarding all used Lp attacks for p ∈ {∞, 2, 1, 0}.
For simplicity we focus on PGD-CE and PGD-Conf while reporting the used black-box attacks together, i.e., taking the
per-example worst-case adversarial examples across all black-box attacks. For comparison, we also include the area under
the ROC curve (ROC AUC), non-thresholded Err and non-thresholded RErr. On MNIST, where AT performs very well in
practice, it is striking that for 4/3 = 0.4 even black-box attacks are able to reduce robustness completely, resulting in high
RErr. This observation also transfers to SVHN and Cifar10. For CCAT, black-box attacks are only effective on Cifar10,
where they result in roughly 87% RErr with τ@99%TPR. For the L2, L1 and L0 attacks we can make similar observations.
Across all Lp norms, it can also be seen that PGD-CE performs significantly worse against our CCAT compared to AT,
which shows that it is essential to optimize the right objective to evaluate the robustness of defenses and adversarially trained
models, i.e., maximize confidence against CCAT.
Results on Corrupted MNIST/Cifar10: We also conducted experiments on MNIST-C (Mu & Gilmer, 2019) and Cifar10-C
(Hendrycks & Dietterich, 2019a). These datasets are variants of MNIST and Cifar10 that contain common perturbations of
the original images obtained from various types of noise, blur or transformations; examples include zoom or motion blue,
Gaussian and shot noise, rotations, translations and shear. Tab. 20 to 23 presents the per-corruption results on MNIST-C and
Cifar10-C, respectively. Here, all includes all corruptions and mean reports the average results across all corruptions. We
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MNIST: Supplementary Results for L∞ Adversarial Examples
Detection Setting
τ@99%TPR
Standard Setting
τ=0
Attack Training ROC
AUC
FPR
in %
Err
in %
RErr
in %
τ
Err
in %
RErr
in %
Worst-Case (L∞,  = 0.30)
Normal 0.34 99.3 0.1 100.0 0.98 0.4 100.0
AT-50% 0.97 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.00 0.5 7.2
AT-100% 0.98 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.00 0.5 7.1
CCAT 0.99 6.9 0.2 7.1 0.85 0.4 48.9
MSD 0.86 32.1 0.9 33.9 0.51 1.8 38.0
TRADES 0.96 3.4 0.1 3.5 0.92 0.5 9.5
PGD Conf (L∞,  = 0.30)
Normal 0.34 99.3 0.1 100.0 0.98 0.4 100.0
AT-50% 0.97 0.4 0.0 0.4 1.00 0.5 5.6
AT-100% 0.98 0.6 0.0 0.6 1.00 0.5 5.4
CCAT 0.98 6.9 0.2 7.1 0.85 0.4 45.9
MSD 0.87 28.7 0.9 30.5 0.51 1.8 34.6
TRADES 0.96 1.6 0.1 1.6 0.92 0.5 7.0
PGD CE (L∞,  = 0.30)
Normal 0.34 99.3 0.1 100.0 0.98 0.4 100.0
AT-50% 0.97 0.8 0.0 0.8 1.00 0.5 6.7
AT-100% 0.98 0.7 0.0 0.7 1.00 0.5 6.3
CCAT 1.00 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.85 0.4 100.0
MSD 0.88 28.0 0.9 29.8 0.51 1.8 37.6
TRADES 0.96 2.8 0.1 2.9 0.92 0.5 8.6
Black-Box (L∞,  = 0.30)
Normal 0.34 99.3 0.1 100.0 0.98 0.4 100.0
AT-50% 0.98 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.00 0.5 7.2
AT-100% 0.98 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.00 0.5 6.9
CCAT 1.00 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.85 0.4 82.4
MSD 0.88 27.7 0.9 29.5 0.51 1.8 35.9
TRADES 0.96 3.2 0.1 3.3 0.92 0.5 9.1
Worst-Case (L∞,  = 0.40)
Normal 0.34 99.3 0.1 100.0 0.98 0.4 100.0
AT-50% 0.20 99.3 0.0 100.0 1.00 0.5 100.0
AT-100% 0.27 99.2 0.0 100.0 1.00 0.5 100.0
CCAT 0.97 11.4 0.2 11.6 0.85 0.4 69.3
MSD 0.66 96.7 0.9 98.9 0.51 1.8 99.8
TRADES 0.56 99.3 0.1 99.9 0.92 0.5 100.0
PGD Conf (L∞,  = 0.40)
Normal 0.34 99.3 0.1 100.0 0.98 0.4 100.0
AT-50% 0.36 97.1 0.0 97.8 1.00 0.5 99.8
AT-100% 0.81 46.5 0.0 46.9 1.00 0.5 77.0
CCAT 0.97 11.4 0.2 11.6 0.85 0.4 58.9
MSD 0.73 89.3 0.9 91.4 0.51 1.8 93.3
TRADES 0.76 87.0 0.1 87.5 0.92 0.5 96.9
PGD CE (L∞,  = 0.40)
Normal 0.34 99.3 0.1 100.0 0.98 0.4 100.0
AT-50% 0.20 99.3 0.0 100.0 1.00 0.5 100.0
AT-100% 0.27 99.2 0.0 100.0 1.00 0.5 100.0
CCAT 1.00 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.85 0.4 100.0
MSD 0.69 95.6 0.9 97.8 0.51 1.8 99.7
TRADES 0.58 99.3 0.1 99.9 0.92 0.5 100.0
Black-Box (L∞,  = 0.40)
Normal 0.34 99.3 0.1 100.0 0.98 0.4 100.0
AT-50% 0.23 99.3 0.0 100.0 1.00 0.5 100.0
AT-100% 0.27 99.2 0.0 100.0 1.00 0.5 100.0
CCAT 1.00 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.85 0.4 91.2
MSD 0.76 92.5 0.9 94.7 0.51 1.8 99.3
TRADES 0.78 95.4 0.1 96.0 0.92 0.5 99.8
Table 9: Per-Attack Results on MNIST, Part I (L∞). Per-attack results considering PGD-CE, as in (Madry et al., 2018),
our PGD-Conf and the remaining black-box attacks for the L∞ threat model. The used  values are reported in the left-most
column. For the black-box attacks, we report the per-example worst-case across all black-box attacks. In addition to FPR
and RErr, we include ROC AUC, Err as well as Err and RErr in the standard, non-thresholded setting, as reference.
note that, due to the thresholding, different numbers of corrupted examples are left after detection for different corruptions.
Thus, the distinction between all and mean is meaningful. Striking is the performance of CCAT on noise corruptions
such as gaussian noise or shot noise. Here, CCAT is able to reject 100% of the corrupted examples, resulting in a
thresholded Err of 0%. This is in stark contrast to AT, exhibiting a Err of roughly 15% after rejection on Cifar10-C. On the
remaining corruptions, CCAT is able to perform slightly better than AT, which is often due to higher detection rate, i.e.,
higher ROC AUC. On, Cifar10, the generally lower Err of CCAT also contributes to the results. Overall, this illustrates
that CCAT is able to preserve the inductive bias of predicting near-uniform distribution on noise similar to L∞ adversarial
examples as seen during training.
Confidence-Calibrated Adversarial Training
MNIST: Supplementary Results for L2 Adversarial Examples
Detection Setting
τ@99%TPR
Standard Setting
τ=0
Attack Training ROC
AUC
FPR
in %
Err
in %
RErr
in %
τ
Err
in %
RErr
in %
Worst-Case (L2,  = 1.5)
Normal 0.39 98.9 0.1 99.6 0.98 0.4 100.0
AT-50% 0.96 2.3 0.0 2.4 1.00 0.5 13.6
AT-100% 0.96 2.6 0.0 2.7 1.00 0.5 12.0
CCAT 1.00 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.85 0.4 6.7
MSD 0.94 7.9 0.9 9.6 0.51 1.8 15.2
TRADES 0.96 2.2 0.1 2.3 0.92 0.5 8.5
PGD Conf (L2,  = 1.5)
Normal 0.56 83.3 0.1 83.9 0.98 0.4 91.6
AT-50% 0.99 0.2 0.0 0.2 1.00 0.5 3.2
AT-100% 0.99 0.1 0.0 0.1 1.00 0.5 2.5
CCAT 1.00 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.85 0.4 5.5
MSD 0.96 2.0 0.9 3.7 0.51 1.8 6.5
TRADES 0.99 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.92 0.5 3.6
PGD CE (L2,  = 1.5)
Normal 0.39 98.8 0.1 99.5 0.98 0.4 99.9
AT-50% 0.96 1.9 0.0 2.0 1.00 0.5 10.2
AT-100% 0.96 1.9 0.0 2.0 1.00 0.5 10.0
CCAT 1.00 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.85 0.4 100.0
MSD 0.94 7.5 0.9 9.2 0.51 1.8 15.8
TRADES 0.96 2.2 0.1 2.3 0.92 0.5 8.2
Black-Box (L2,  = 1.5)
Normal 0.55 91.0 0.1 91.7 0.98 0.4 97.4
AT-50% 0.97 0.8 0.0 0.8 1.00 0.5 8.1
AT-100% 0.98 0.9 0.0 0.9 1.00 0.5 6.8
CCAT 1.00 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.85 0.4 84.8
MSD 0.95 3.6 0.9 5.3 0.51 1.8 8.6
TRADES 0.99 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.92 0.5 4.4
Worst-Case (L2,  = 3)
Normal 0.34 99.3 0.1 100.0 0.98 0.4 100.0
AT-50% 0.73 80.7 0.0 81.4 1.00 0.5 98.8
AT-100% 0.66 83.9 0.0 84.7 1.00 0.5 98.5
CCAT 1.00 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.85 0.4 15.5
MSD 0.81 57.0 0.9 59.0 0.51 1.8 67.6
TRADES 0.90 43.6 0.1 44.0 0.92 0.5 69.9
PGD Conf (L2,  = 3)
Normal 0.41 93.2 0.1 93.9 0.98 0.4 96.9
AT-50% 0.98 0.2 0.0 0.2 1.00 0.5 3.4
AT-100% 0.99 0.1 0.0 0.1 1.00 0.5 2.7
CCAT 1.00 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.85 0.4 4.9
MSD 0.96 2.3 0.9 4.0 0.51 1.8 7.3
TRADES 0.98 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.92 0.5 3.8
PGD CE (L2,  = 3)
Normal 0.34 99.3 0.1 100.0 0.98 0.4 100.0
AT-50% 0.93 11.3 0.0 11.5 1.00 0.5 29.2
AT-100% 0.92 9.3 0.0 9.5 1.00 0.5 24.5
CCAT 1.00 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.85 0.4 100.0
MSD 0.82 55.7 0.9 57.8 0.51 1.8 67.7
TRADES 0.95 5.3 0.1 5.4 0.92 0.5 15.9
Black-Box (L2,  = 3)
Normal 0.35 99.3 0.1 100.0 0.98 0.4 100.0
AT-50% 0.73 79.5 0.0 80.1 1.00 0.5 98.7
AT-100% 0.67 83.0 0.0 83.8 1.00 0.5 98.1
CCAT 1.00 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.85 0.4 88.4
MSD 0.88 28.6 0.9 30.4 0.51 1.8 37.4
TRADES 0.91 42.6 0.1 43.0 0.92 0.5 69.1
Table 10: Per-Attack Results on MNIST, Part II (L2). Per-attack results considering PGD-CE, as in (Madry et al., 2018),
our PGD-Conf and the remaining black-box attacks for the L2 threat model. The used  values are reported in the left-most
column. For the black-box attacks, we report the per-example worst-case across all black-box attacks. In addition to FPR
and RErr we include ROC AUC, Err as well as Err and RErr in the standard, non-thresholded setting, as reference.
Confidence-Calibrated Adversarial Training
MNIST: Supplementary Results for L1 Adversarial Examples
Detection Setting
τ@99%TPR
Standard Setting
τ=0
Attack Training ROC
AUC
FPR
in %
Err
in %
RErr
in %
τ
Err
in %
RErr
in %
Worst-Case (L1,  = 12)
Normal 0.44 98.9 0.1 99.6 0.98 0.4 100.0
AT-50% 0.93 8.6 0.0 8.8 1.00 0.5 26.3
AT-100% 0.91 8.2 0.0 8.4 1.00 0.5 23.6
CCAT 1.00 0.8 0.2 1.0 0.85 0.4 16.5
MSD 0.87 25.5 0.9 27.3 0.51 1.8 32.3
TRADES 0.96 2.7 0.1 2.8 0.92 0.5 9.5
PGD Conf (L1,  = 12)
Normal 0.45 98.9 0.1 99.6 0.98 0.4 100.0
AT-50% 0.92 6.3 0.0 6.4 1.00 0.5 19.3
AT-100% 0.90 5.8 0.0 6.0 1.00 0.5 16.7
CCAT 1.00 0.7 0.2 0.9 0.85 0.4 14.2
MSD 0.87 24.8 0.9 26.6 0.51 1.8 31.7
TRADES 0.96 1.8 0.1 1.9 0.92 0.5 6.7
PGD CE (L1,  = 12)
Normal 0.58 92.4 0.1 93.1 0.98 0.4 96.5
AT-50% 0.94 6.4 0.0 6.6 1.00 0.5 20.2
AT-100% 0.92 5.9 0.0 6.1 1.00 0.5 17.3
CCAT 1.00 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.85 0.4 100.0
MSD 0.92 12.5 0.9 14.3 0.51 1.8 21.8
TRADES 0.96 2.4 0.1 2.5 0.92 0.5 8.8
Black-Box (L1,  = 12)
Normal 0.98 3.3 0.1 3.5 0.98 0.4 10.8
AT-50% 0.96 0.7 0.0 0.7 1.00 0.5 4.4
AT-100% 0.97 0.8 0.0 0.8 1.00 0.5 5.3
CCAT 1.00 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.85 0.4 8.8
MSD 0.96 0.4 0.9 2.1 0.51 1.8 3.2
TRADES 0.98 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.92 0.5 1.4
Worst-Case (L1,  = 18)
Normal 0.36 99.3 0.1 100.0 0.98 0.4 100.0
AT-50% 0.88 23.8 0.0 24.1 1.00 0.5 50.4
AT-100% 0.88 20.2 0.0 20.7 1.00 0.5 43.8
CCAT 1.00 1.3 0.2 1.5 0.85 0.4 22.0
MSD 0.81 53.7 0.9 55.6 0.51 1.8 60.8
TRADES 0.95 8.2 0.1 8.4 0.92 0.5 21.4
PGD Conf (L1,  = 18)
Normal 0.36 99.3 0.1 100.0 0.98 0.4 100.0
AT-50% 0.88 15.5 0.0 15.7 1.00 0.5 33.8
AT-100% 0.87 12.7 0.0 13.0 1.00 0.5 27.6
CCAT 1.00 0.8 0.2 1.0 0.85 0.4 15.5
MSD 0.81 53.1 0.9 55.0 0.51 1.8 60.3
TRADES 0.95 2.9 0.1 3.0 0.92 0.5 8.9
PGD CE (L1,  = 18)
Normal 0.45 97.7 0.1 98.4 0.98 0.4 98.8
AT-50% 0.90 17.0 0.0 17.3 1.00 0.5 37.6
AT-100% 0.90 11.7 0.0 12.0 1.00 0.5 29.8
CCAT 1.00 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.85 0.4 100.0
MSD 0.88 27.0 0.9 28.9 0.51 1.8 36.3
TRADES 0.95 4.8 0.1 4.9 0.92 0.5 13.6
Black-Box (L1,  = 18)
Normal 0.98 3.3 0.1 3.5 0.98 0.4 10.8
AT-50% 0.96 0.7 0.0 0.7 1.00 0.5 4.4
AT-100% 0.97 0.8 0.0 0.8 1.00 0.5 5.3
CCAT 1.00 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.85 0.4 8.8
MSD 0.96 0.4 0.9 2.1 0.51 1.8 3.2
TRADES 0.98 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.92 0.5 1.4
Table 11: Per-Attack Results on MNIST, Part III (L1). Per-attack results considering PGD-CE, as in (Madry et al.,
2018), our PGD-Conf and the remaining black-box attacks for the L1 threat model. The used  values are reported in the
left-most column. For the black-box attacks, we report the per-example worst-case across all black-box attacks. In addition
to FPR and RErr we include ROC AUC, Err as well as Err and RErr in the standard, non-thresholded setting, as reference.
Confidence-Calibrated Adversarial Training
MNIST: Supplementary Results for L0 Adversarial Examples and Adversarial Frames
Detection Setting
τ@99%TPR
Standard Setting
τ=0
Attack Training ROC
AUC
FPR
in %
Err
in %
RErr
in %
τ
Err
in %
RErr
in %
Worst-Case (L0,  = 15)
Normal 0.63 91.6 0.1 92.3 0.98 0.4 99.1
AT-50% 0.94 23.0 0.0 23.5 1.00 0.5 95.3
AT-100% 0.98 12.9 0.0 13.3 1.00 0.5 94.3
CCAT 0.99 14.2 0.2 14.5 0.85 0.4 83.5
MSD 0.75 64.2 0.9 66.2 0.51 1.8 74.2
TRADES 0.87 34.6 0.1 35.1 0.92 0.5 86.7
PGD Conf (L0,  = 15)
Normal 0.69 84.4 0.1 85.0 0.98 0.4 92.7
AT-50% 0.98 0.5 0.0 0.5 1.00 0.5 5.2
AT-100% 0.98 0.3 0.0 0.3 1.00 0.5 3.6
CCAT 0.99 3.1 0.2 3.3 0.85 0.4 13.7
MSD 0.88 26.7 0.9 28.5 0.51 1.8 35.4
TRADES 0.97 3.0 0.1 3.1 0.92 0.5 12.6
PGD CE (L0,  = 15)
Normal 0.63 90.3 0.1 90.9 0.98 0.4 95.2
AT-50% 0.98 2.3 0.0 2.4 1.00 0.5 17.7
AT-100% 0.99 0.5 0.0 0.5 1.00 0.5 11.1
CCAT 1.00 0.9 0.2 1.1 0.85 0.4 10.3
MSD 0.88 30.5 0.9 32.3 0.51 1.8 41.5
TRADES 0.95 10.7 0.1 11.0 0.92 0.5 27.9
Black-Box (L0,  = 15)
Normal 0.97 18.3 0.1 18.5 0.98 0.4 98.6
AT-50% 0.94 21.7 0.0 22.3 1.00 0.5 95.3
AT-100% 0.98 12.9 0.0 13.3 1.00 0.5 94.3
CCAT 0.99 12.5 0.2 12.8 0.85 0.4 84.4
MSD 0.78 51.8 0.9 54.0 0.51 1.8 70.8
TRADES 0.88 31.7 0.1 32.4 0.92 0.5 86.7
Adversarial Frames
Normal 0.69 87.0 0.1 87.6 0.98 0.4 94.6
AT-50% 0.82 72.9 0.0 73.6 1.00 0.5 95.4
AT-100% 0.86 61.3 0.0 62.0 1.00 0.5 93.9
CCAT 1.00 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.85 0.4 95.4
MSD 0.96 6.6 0.9 8.3 0.51 1.8 17.3
TRADES 0.99 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.92 0.5 1.9
Table 12: Per-Attack Results on MNIST, Part IV (L0, Adversarial Frames). Per-attack results considering PGD-CE,
as in (Madry et al., 2018), our PGD-Conf and the remaining black-box attacks for L0 threat models and adversarial frames.
The used  values are reported in the left-most column. For the black-box attacks, we report the per-example worst-case
across all black-box attacks. In addition to FPR and RErr we include ROC AUC, Err as well as Err and RErr in the standard,
non-thresholded setting, as reference.
Confidence-Calibrated Adversarial Training
SVHN: Supplementary Results for L∞ Adversarial Examples
Detection Setting
τ@99%TPR
Standard Setting
τ=0
Attack Training ROC
AUC
FPR
in %
Err
in %
RErr
in %
τ
Err
in %
RErr
in %
Worst-Case (L∞,  = 0.03)
Normal 0.17 95.8 2.6 99.9 0.78 3.6 100.0
AT-50% 0.55 52.3 2.5 55.6 0.56 3.4 57.3
AT-100% 0.73 42.1 4.6 47.5 0.27 5.9 48.4
CCAT 0.70 35.5 2.1 38.5 0.60 2.9 97.8
PGD Conf (L∞,  = 0.03)
Normal 0.17 95.8 2.6 99.9 0.78 3.6 99.9
AT-50% 0.55 51.6 2.5 54.9 0.56 3.4 56.9
AT-100% 0.73 40.9 4.6 46.2 0.27 5.9 47.1
CCAT 0.67 35.5 2.1 38.5 0.60 2.9 91.0
PGD CE (L∞,  = 0.03)
Normal 0.17 95.8 2.6 99.9 0.78 3.6 100.0
AT-50% 0.68 40.0 2.5 43.2 0.56 3.4 50.7
AT-100% 0.81 34.6 4.6 39.9 0.27 5.9 45.3
CCAT 1.00 0.0 2.1 2.6 0.60 2.9 94.9
Black-Box (L∞,  = 0.03)
Normal 0.23 95.6 2.6 99.7 0.78 3.6 99.7
AT-50% 0.95 27.7 2.5 30.8 0.56 3.4 46.2
AT-100% 0.78 38.5 4.6 43.8 0.27 5.9 45.5
CCAT 1.00 3.7 2.1 6.4 0.60 2.9 79.6
Worst-Case (L∞,  = 0.06)
Normal 0.16 95.9 2.6 100.0 0.78 3.6 100.0
AT-50% 0.32 84.7 2.5 88.3 0.56 3.4 89.0
AT-100% 0.38 80.9 4.6 86.9 0.27 5.9 87.1
CCAT 0.64 49.5 2.1 52.6 0.60 2.9 99.9
PGD Conf (L∞,  = 0.06)
Normal 0.16 95.9 2.6 100.0 0.78 3.6 100.0
AT-50% 0.31 81.1 2.5 84.7 0.56 3.4 86.1
AT-100% 0.40 77.4 4.6 83.3 0.27 5.9 83.6
CCAT 0.64 42.1 2.1 45.2 0.60 2.9 98.1
PGD CE (L∞,  = 0.06)
Normal 0.16 95.9 2.6 100.0 0.78 3.6 100.0
AT-50% 0.61 84.4 2.5 88.0 0.56 3.4 88.9
AT-100% 0.43 80.9 4.6 86.9 0.27 5.9 87.1
CCAT 0.99 14.3 2.1 17.2 0.60 2.9 100.0
Black-Box (L∞,  = 0.06)
Normal 0.17 95.9 2.6 100.0 0.78 3.6 100.0
AT-50% 0.78 78.9 2.5 82.4 0.56 3.4 84.0
AT-100% 0.51 76.5 4.6 82.4 0.27 5.9 82.7
CCAT 1.00 4.5 2.1 7.2 0.60 2.9 83.7
Table 13: Per-Attack Results on SVHN, Part I (L∞). Per-attack results considering PGD-CE, as in (Madry et al., 2018),
our PGD-Conf and the remaining black-box attacks for the L∞ threat model. The used  values are reported in the left-most
column. For the black-box attacks, we report the per-example worst-case across all black-box attacks. In addition to FPR
and RErr we include ROC AUC, Err as well as Err and RErr in the standard, non-thresholded setting, as reference.
Confidence-Calibrated Adversarial Training
SVHN: Supplementary Results for L2 Adversarial Examples
Detection Setting
τ@99%TPR
Standard Setting
τ=0
Attack Training ROC
AUC
FPR
in %
Err
in %
RErr
in %
τ
Err
in %
RErr
in %
Worst-Case (L2,  = 0.5)
Normal 0.27 93.3 2.6 97.4 0.78 3.6 97.7
AT-50% 0.53 65.2 2.5 68.6 0.56 3.4 70.7
AT-100% 0.67 60.1 4.6 65.8 0.27 5.9 66.3
CCAT 0.87 17.2 2.1 20.0 0.60 2.9 63.3
PGD Conf (L2,  = 0.5)
Normal 0.32 91.1 2.6 95.1 0.78 3.6 96.4
AT-50% 0.56 57.5 2.5 60.8 0.56 3.4 62.9
AT-100% 0.68 54.0 4.6 59.6 0.27 5.9 60.2
CCAT 0.85 16.9 2.1 19.7 0.60 2.9 54.5
PGD CE (L2,  = 0.5)
Normal 0.28 93.3 2.6 97.4 0.78 3.6 97.7
AT-50% 0.57 63.1 2.5 66.5 0.56 3.4 70.1
AT-100% 0.72 57.7 4.6 63.5 0.27 5.9 66.5
CCAT 0.99 1.8 2.1 4.5 0.60 2.9 100.0
Black-Box (L2,  = 0.5)
Normal 0.67 53.8 2.6 57.3 0.78 3.6 63.7
AT-50% 0.99 3.0 2.5 5.9 0.56 3.4 13.8
AT-100% 0.90 7.3 4.6 12.2 0.27 5.9 15.3
CCAT 1.00 0.1 2.1 2.7 0.60 2.9 91.3
Worst-Case(L2,  = 1)
Normal 0.17 95.8 2.6 99.9 0.78 3.6 99.9
AT-50% 0.26 88.4 2.5 92.0 0.56 3.4 92.4
AT-100% 0.38 87.3 4.6 93.4 0.27 5.9 93.5
CCAT 0.88 18.9 2.1 21.7 0.60 2.9 80.9
PGD Conf (L2,  = 1)
Normal 0.22 95.4 2.6 99.5 0.78 3.6 99.6
AT-50% 0.49 73.6 2.5 77.1 0.56 3.4 78.7
AT-100% 0.48 75.5 4.6 81.4 0.27 5.9 81.7
CCAT 0.88 18.6 2.1 21.4 0.60 2.9 74.6
PGD CE (L2,  = 1)
Normal 0.17 95.8 2.6 99.9 0.78 3.6 99.9
AT-50% 0.27 88.4 2.5 92.0 0.56 3.4 92.4
AT-100% 0.39 87.3 4.6 93.4 0.27 5.9 93.5
CCAT 0.99 2.1 2.1 4.8 0.60 2.9 100.0
Black-Box (L2,  = 1)
Normal 0.42 88.3 2.6 92.3 0.78 3.6 94.4
AT-50% 0.98 10.8 2.5 13.8 0.56 3.4 29.8
AT-100% 0.85 22.5 4.6 27.7 0.27 5.9 30.1
CCAT 1.00 0.1 2.1 2.7 0.60 2.9 96.5
Worst-Case (L2,  = 2)
Normal 0.16 95.9 2.6 100.0 0.78 3.6 100.0
AT-50% 0.11 95.7 2.5 99.4 0.56 3.4 99.4
AT-100% 0.12 93.3 4.6 99.5 0.27 5.9 99.5
CCAT 0.89 25.4 2.1 28.3 0.60 2.9 91.9
PGD Conf (L2,  = 2)
Normal 0.21 95.4 2.6 99.5 0.78 3.6 99.8
AT-50% 0.49 76.2 2.5 79.7 0.56 3.4 81.2
AT-100% 0.45 78.1 4.6 84.0 0.27 5.9 84.3
CCAT 0.89 19.1 2.1 21.9 0.60 2.9 88.0
PGD CE (L2,  = 2)
Normal 0.16 95.9 2.6 100.0 0.78 3.6 100.0
AT-50% 0.12 95.7 2.5 99.4 0.56 3.4 99.4
AT-100% 0.12 93.3 4.6 99.5 0.27 5.9 99.5
CCAT 0.98 5.0 2.1 7.7 0.60 2.9 100.0
Table 14: Per-Attack Results on SVHN, Part II (L2). Per-attack results considering PGD-CE, as in (Madry et al., 2018),
our PGD-Conf and the remaining black-box attacks for L2 threat model. The used  values are reported in the left-most
column. For the black-box attacks, we report the per-example worst-case across all black-box attacks. In addition to FPR
and RErr we include ROC AUC, Err as well as Err and RErr in the standard, non-thresholded setting, as reference.
Confidence-Calibrated Adversarial Training
SVHN: Supplementary Results for L1, L0 Adversarial Examples and Adversarial Frames
Detection Setting
τ@99%TPR
Standard Setting
τ=0
Attack Training ROC
AUC
FPR
in %
Err
in %
RErr
in %
τ
Err
in %
RErr
in %
Worst-Case (L1,  = 18)
Normal 0.17 95.9 2.6 100.0 0.78 3.6 100.0
AT-50% 0.09 95.0 2.5 98.7 0.56 3.4 98.7
AT-100% 0.14 93.1 4.6 99.3 0.27 5.9 99.3
CCAT 0.82 24.3 2.1 27.2 0.60 2.9 72.8
PGD Conf (L1,  = 18)
Normal 0.17 95.9 2.6 100.0 0.78 3.6 100.0
AT-50% 0.11 94.8 2.5 98.5 0.56 3.4 98.5
AT-100% 0.15 92.9 4.6 99.1 0.27 5.9 99.1
CCAT 0.82 23.4 2.1 26.3 0.60 2.9 69.3
PGD CE (L1,  = 18)
Normal 0.21 95.7 2.6 99.8 0.78 3.6 99.8
AT-50% 0.29 92.8 2.5 96.5 0.56 3.4 96.6
AT-100% 0.27 92.1 4.6 98.3 0.27 5.9 98.3
CCAT 0.99 2.7 2.1 5.4 0.60 2.9 100.0
Black-Box (L1,  = 18)
Normal 0.89 6.2 2.6 9.2 0.78 3.6 13.0
AT-50% 0.97 3.7 2.5 6.6 0.56 3.4 10.9
AT-100% 0.90 7.4 4.6 12.3 0.27 5.9 14.9
CCAT 1.00 0.5 2.1 3.2 0.60 2.9 10.0
Worst-Case (L1,  = 24)
Normal 0.16 95.9 2.6 100.0 0.78 3.6 100.0
AT-50% 0.05 95.8 2.5 99.5 0.56 3.4 99.5
AT-100% 0.09 93.6 4.6 99.8 0.27 5.9 99.8
CCAT 0.80 28.1 2.1 31.0 0.60 2.9 77.0
PGD Conf (L1,  = 24)
Normal 0.16 95.9 2.6 100.0 0.78 3.6 100.0
AT-50% 0.06 95.7 2.5 99.4 0.56 3.4 99.4
AT-100% 0.09 93.6 4.6 99.8 0.27 5.9 99.8
CCAT 0.79 27.1 2.1 30.0 0.60 2.9 73.3
PGD CE (L1,  = 24)
Normal 0.19 95.8 2.6 99.9 0.78 3.6 99.9
AT-50% 0.25 94.0 2.5 97.7 0.56 3.4 98.0
AT-100% 0.22 92.5 4.6 98.7 0.27 5.9 98.7
CCAT 0.98 3.4 2.1 6.1 0.60 2.9 100.0
Black-Box (L1,  = 24)
Normal 0.86 18.7 2.6 21.8 0.78 3.6 27.1
AT-50% 0.96 11.2 2.5 14.2 0.56 3.4 22.2
AT-100% 0.86 16.3 4.6 21.3 0.27 5.9 24.6
CCAT 1.00 1.3 2.1 4.0 0.60 2.9 18.3
Worst-Case (L0,  = 10)
Normal 0.60 79.6 2.6 83.5 0.78 3.6 98.0
AT-50% 0.90 70.0 2.5 73.5 0.56 3.4 89.2
AT-100% 0.65 83.1 4.6 89.2 0.27 5.9 89.9
CCAT 1.00 0.4 2.1 3.0 0.60 2.9 75.3
PGD Conf (L0,  = 10)
Normal 0.55 63.4 2.6 67.1 0.78 3.6 69.0
AT-50% 0.90 48.0 2.5 51.3 0.56 3.4 59.7
AT-100% 0.64 61.3 4.6 67.2 0.27 5.9 68.0
CCAT 1.00 0.1 2.1 2.7 0.60 2.9 63.9
PGD CE (L0,  = 10)
Normal 0.52 71.4 2.6 75.2 0.78 3.6 78.1
AT-50% 0.89 57.4 2.5 60.8 0.56 3.4 68.9
AT-100% 0.65 68.2 4.6 74.2 0.27 5.9 75.5
CCAT 1.00 0.0 2.1 2.6 0.60 2.9 96.9
Black-Box (L0,  = 10)
Normal 0.96 44.5 2.6 47.9 0.78 3.6 97.7
AT-50% 0.98 34.4 2.5 37.7 0.56 3.4 86.6
AT-100% 0.86 74.3 4.6 80.6 0.27 5.9 85.5
CCAT 1.00 0.3 2.1 3.0 0.60 2.9 93.1
Adversarial Frames
Normal 0.47 74.6 2.6 78.4 0.78 3.6 80.1
AT-50% 0.77 30.0 2.5 33.1 0.56 3.4 36.0
AT-100% 0.78 19.9 4.6 25.1 0.27 5.9 27.4
CCAT 1.00 1.0 2.1 3.7 0.60 2.9 97.3
Table 15: Per-Attack Results on SVHN, Part III (L1, L0, Adversarial Frames). Per-attack results considering PGD-CE,
as in (Madry et al., 2018), our PGD-Conf and the remaining black-box attacks for L1, L0 threat models and adversarial
frames. The used  values are reported in the left-most column. For the black-box attacks, we report the per-example
worst-case across all black-box attacks. In addition to FPR and RErr we include ROC AUC, Err as well as Err and RErr in
the standard, non-thresholded setting, as reference.
Confidence-Calibrated Adversarial Training
CIFAR10: Supplementary Results for L∞ Adversarial Examples
Detection Setting
τ@99%TPR
Standard Setting
τ=0
Attack Training ROC
AUC
FPR
in %
Err
in %
RErr
in %
τ
Err
in %
RErr
in %
Worst-Case (L∞ ,  = 0.03)
Normal 0.20 93.0 7.4 100.0 0.59 8.3 100.0
AT-50% 0.64 47.6 15.1 62.3 0.35 16.6 62.7
AT-100% 0.64 42.3 18.3 59.5 0.29 19.4 59.9
CCAT 0.60 59.9 8.7 67.9 0.40 10.1 96.7
MSD 0.66 35.3 17.6 53.0 0.24 18.4 53.2
TRADES 0.73 28.9 13.2 41.9 0.30 15.2 43.5
AT-Madry 0.73 33.8 11.7 44.4 0.29 13.0 45.1
PGD Conf (L∞ ,  = 0.03)
Normal 0.20 93.0 7.4 100.0 0.59 8.3 100.0
AT-50% 0.65 46.2 15.1 60.9 0.35 16.6 61.3
AT-100% 0.65 40.0 18.3 57.2 0.29 19.4 57.6
CCAT 0.60 55.1 8.7 63.0 0.40 10.1 95.0
MSD 0.66 33.0 17.6 50.7 0.24 18.4 50.9
TRADES 0.73 28.2 13.2 41.2 0.30 15.2 42.8
AT-Madry 0.73 31.9 11.7 42.5 0.29 13.0 43.2
PGD CE (L∞ ,  = 0.03)
Normal 0.20 93.0 7.4 100.0 0.59 8.3 100.0
AT-50% 0.67 46.7 15.1 61.4 0.35 16.6 62.3
AT-100% 0.69 40.5 18.3 57.7 0.29 19.4 59.3
CCAT 0.99 2.5 8.7 9.8 0.40 10.1 100.0
MSD 0.75 33.2 17.6 50.9 0.24 18.4 52.6
TRADES 0.80 25.3 13.2 38.4 0.30 15.2 42.9
AT-Madry 0.78 30.3 11.7 40.9 0.29 13.0 44.2
Black-Box (L∞ ,  = 0.03)
Normal 0.21 93.0 7.4 100.0 0.59 8.3 100.0
AT-50% 0.70 42.2 15.1 56.9 0.35 16.6 57.3
AT-100% 0.70 36.9 18.3 54.1 0.29 19.4 54.7
CCAT 0.90 41.6 8.7 49.3 0.40 10.1 96.4
MSD 0.73 30.2 17.6 47.9 0.24 18.4 48.4
TRADES 0.78 25.1 13.2 38.0 0.30 15.2 40.0
AT-Madry 0.78 29.2 11.7 39.7 0.29 13.0 41.2
Worst-Case (L∞ ,  = 0.06)
Normal 0.20 93.0 7.4 100.0 0.59 8.3 100.0
AT-50% 0.35 78.6 15.1 93.6 0.35 16.6 93.7
AT-100% 0.39 72.7 18.3 90.2 0.29 19.4 90.3
CCAT 0.40 83.9 8.7 92.3 0.40 10.1 99.4
MSD 0.43 71.5 17.6 89.4 0.24 18.4 89.4
TRADES 0.53 66.4 13.2 80.5 0.30 15.2 81.0
AT-Madry 0.46 73.2 11.7 84.3 0.29 13.0 84.5
PGD Conf (L∞ ,  = 0.06)
Normal 0.20 93.0 7.4 100.0 0.59 8.3 100.0
AT-50% 0.37 77.1 15.1 92.1 0.35 16.6 92.2
AT-100% 0.43 70.7 18.3 88.2 0.29 19.4 88.3
CCAT 0.45 64.5 8.7 72.6 0.40 10.1 97.4
MSD 0.46 68.7 17.6 86.5 0.24 18.4 86.6
TRADES 0.54 63.9 13.2 77.9 0.30 15.2 78.5
AT-Madry 0.51 69.4 11.7 80.4 0.29 13.0 80.7
PGD CE (L∞ ,  = 0.06)
Normal 0.20 93.0 7.4 100.0 0.59 8.3 100.0
AT-50% 0.40 78.6 15.1 93.6 0.35 16.6 93.7
AT-100% 0.45 72.7 18.3 90.2 0.29 19.4 90.3
CCAT 0.98 3.7 8.7 11.0 0.40 10.1 100.0
MSD 0.53 71.6 17.6 89.5 0.24 18.4 89.5
TRADES 0.64 64.8 13.2 78.8 0.30 15.2 80.4
AT-Madry 0.50 73.1 11.7 84.2 0.29 13.0 84.4
Black-Box (L∞ ,  = 0.06)
Normal 0.20 93.0 7.4 100.0 0.59 8.3 100.0
AT-50% 0.50 72.1 15.1 87.1 0.35 16.6 87.2
AT-100% 0.53 65.9 18.3 83.4 0.29 19.4 83.5
CCAT 0.77 79.1 8.7 87.4 0.40 10.1 99.7
MSD 0.58 60.5 17.6 78.3 0.24 18.4 78.5
TRADES 0.65 57.6 13.2 71.4 0.30 15.2 72.2
AT-Madry 0.62 63.5 11.7 74.5 0.29 13.0 75.2
Table 16: Per-Attack Results on Cifar10, Part I (L∞). Per-attack results considering PGD-CE, as in (Madry et al., 2018),
our PGD-Conf and the remaining black-box attacks for L∞ and L2 threat models. The used  values are reported in the
left-most column. For the black-box attacks, we report the per-example worst-case across all black-box attacks. In addition
to FPR and RErr we include ROC AUC, Err as well as Err and RErr in the standard, non-thresholded setting, as reference.
Confidence-Calibrated Adversarial Training
CIFAR10: Supplementary Results for L2 Adversarial Examples
Detection Setting
τ@99%TPR
Standard Setting
τ=0
Attack Training ROC
AUC
FPR
in %
Err
in %
RErr
in %
τ
Err
in %
RErr
in %
Worst-Case (L2,  = 1)
Normal 0.20 93.0 7.4 100.0 0.59 8.3 100.0
AT-50% 0.59 59.1 15.1 73.9 0.35 16.6 74.4
AT-100% 0.57 55.8 18.3 73.2 0.29 19.4 73.4
CCAT 0.75 42.6 8.7 50.4 0.40 10.1 83.2
MSD 0.68 34.3 17.6 52.0 0.24 18.4 52.2
TRADES 0.64 56.3 13.2 70.1 0.30 15.2 71.3
AT-Madry 0.59 62.4 11.7 73.4 0.29 13.0 73.8
PGD Conf (L2,  = 1)
Normal 0.20 93.0 7.4 100.0 0.59 8.3 100.0
AT-50% 0.63 50.2 15.1 64.9 0.35 16.6 65.3
AT-100% 0.62 46.4 18.3 63.7 0.29 19.4 64.0
CCAT 0.76 41.9 8.7 49.6 0.40 10.1 82.6
MSD 0.68 30.4 17.6 48.1 0.24 18.4 48.3
TRADES 0.67 43.1 13.2 56.5 0.30 15.2 57.7
AT-Madry 0.68 44.8 11.7 55.5 0.29 13.0 56.1
PGD CE (L2,  = 1)
Normal 0.20 93.0 7.4 100.0 0.59 8.3 100.0
AT-50% 0.61 59.1 15.1 73.9 0.35 16.6 74.6
AT-100% 0.60 55.1 18.3 72.5 0.29 19.4 73.7
CCAT 0.93 13.8 8.7 21.2 0.40 10.1 100.0
MSD 0.74 33.6 17.6 51.3 0.24 18.4 52.1
TRADES 0.68 56.1 13.2 70.0 0.30 15.2 72.6
AT-Madry 0.61 61.9 11.7 72.9 0.29 13.0 74.1
Black-Box (L2,  = 1)
Normal 0.38 90.1 7.4 97.1 0.59 8.3 97.4
AT-50% 0.81 21.3 15.1 35.8 0.35 16.6 36.9
AT-100% 0.78 19.8 18.3 36.8 0.29 19.4 37.8
CCAT 0.99 5.0 8.7 12.3 0.40 10.1 78.8
MSD 0.80 16.5 17.6 34.2 0.24 18.4 34.6
TRADES 0.84 15.2 13.2 27.9 0.30 15.2 31.0
AT-Madry 0.83 16.3 11.7 26.7 0.29 13.0 28.8
Worst-Case (L2,  = 2)
Normal 0.20 93.0 7.4 100.0 0.59 8.3 100.0
AT-50% 0.28 83.3 15.1 98.4 0.35 16.6 98.4
AT-100% 0.34 80.7 18.3 98.3 0.29 19.4 98.4
CCAT 0.74 43.7 8.7 51.5 0.40 10.1 85.8
MSD 0.53 70.6 17.6 88.5 0.24 18.4 88.8
TRADES 0.64 56.3 13.2 70.1 0.30 15.2 71.3
AT-Madry 0.26 87.4 11.7 98.7 0.29 13.0 98.7
PGD Conf (L2,  = 2)
Normal 0.20 93.0 7.4 100.0 0.59 8.3 100.0
AT-50% 0.62 52.4 15.1 67.2 0.35 16.6 67.5
AT-100% 0.60 48.2 18.3 65.5 0.29 19.4 65.8
CCAT 0.76 42.4 8.7 50.2 0.40 10.1 84.6
MSD 0.67 31.9 17.6 49.6 0.24 18.4 49.8
TRADES 0.67 43.1 13.2 56.5 0.30 15.2 57.7
AT-Madry 0.67 48.6 11.7 59.4 0.29 13.0 59.9
PGD CE (L2,  = 2)
Normal 0.20 93.0 7.4 100.0 0.59 8.3 100.0
AT-50% 0.28 83.3 15.1 98.4 0.35 16.6 98.4
AT-100% 0.34 80.7 18.3 98.3 0.29 19.4 98.4
CCAT 0.92 15.9 8.7 23.3 0.40 10.1 100.0
MSD 0.54 71.2 17.6 89.1 0.24 18.4 89.5
TRADES 0.68 56.1 13.2 70.0 0.30 15.2 72.6
AT-Madry 0.26 87.4 11.7 98.7 0.29 13.0 98.7
Black-Box (L2,  = 2)
Normal 0.21 93.0 7.4 100.0 0.59 8.3 100.0
AT-50% 0.67 47.5 15.1 62.2 0.35 16.6 62.6
AT-100% 0.66 43.4 18.3 60.6 0.29 19.4 61.3
CCAT 0.99 7.7 8.7 15.1 0.40 10.1 81.0
MSD 0.71 33.7 17.6 51.5 0.24 18.4 51.8
TRADES 0.84 15.2 13.2 27.9 0.30 15.2 31.0
AT-Madry 0.73 42.2 11.7 52.9 0.29 13.0 53.9
Table 17: Per-Attack Results on Cifar10, Part II (L2). Per-attack results considering PGD-CE, as in (Madry et al., 2018),
our PGD-Conf and the remaining black-box attacks for the L2 threat model. The used  values are reported in the left-most
column. For the black-box attacks, we report the per-example worst-case across all black-box attacks. In addition to FPR
and RErr we include ROC AUC, Err as well as Err and RErr in the standard, non-thresholded setting, as reference.
Confidence-Calibrated Adversarial Training
CIFAR10: Supplementary Results for L1 Adversarial Examples
Detection Setting
τ@99%TPR
Standard Setting
τ=0
Attack Training ROC
AUC
FPR
in %
Err
in %
RErr
in %
τ
Err
in %
RErr
in %
Worst-Case (L1,  = 18)
Normal 0.20 93.0 7.4 100.0 0.59 8.3 100.0
AT-50% 0.39 80.1 15.1 95.2 0.35 16.6 95.2
AT-100% 0.39 76.8 18.3 94.3 0.29 19.4 94.4
CCAT 0.67 47.6 8.7 55.4 0.40 10.1 85.4
MSD 0.63 40.0 17.6 57.7 0.24 18.4 57.9
TRADES 0.45 78.6 13.2 93.0 0.30 15.2 93.2
AT-Madry 0.39 83.0 11.7 94.2 0.29 13.0 94.3
PGD Conf (L1,  = 18)
Normal 0.20 93.0 7.4 100.0 0.59 8.3 100.0
AT-50% 0.39 79.9 15.1 94.9 0.35 16.6 95.0
AT-100% 0.40 76.5 18.3 94.0 0.29 19.4 94.1
CCAT 0.67 47.3 8.7 55.1 0.40 10.1 85.4
MSD 0.63 38.6 17.6 56.3 0.24 18.4 56.5
TRADES 0.45 78.4 13.2 92.8 0.30 15.2 93.0
AT-Madry 0.41 82.5 11.7 93.7 0.29 13.0 93.8
PGD CE (L1,  = 18)
Normal 0.20 92.9 7.4 99.9 0.59 8.3 99.9
AT-50% 0.57 69.0 15.1 83.9 0.35 16.6 85.0
AT-100% 0.55 66.2 18.3 83.7 0.29 19.4 84.6
CCAT 0.94 13.8 8.7 21.1 0.40 10.1 100.0
MSD 0.75 32.2 17.6 49.9 0.24 18.4 51.1
TRADES 0.63 69.4 13.2 83.6 0.30 15.2 85.5
AT-Madry 0.55 74.6 11.7 85.8 0.29 13.0 87.0
Black-Box (L1,  = 18)
Normal 0.94 3.6 7.4 9.9 0.59 8.3 11.6
AT-50% 0.93 1.9 15.1 16.3 0.35 16.6 17.6
AT-100% 0.93 1.0 18.3 17.9 0.29 19.4 19.1
CCAT 0.99 0.8 8.7 8.1 0.40 10.1 18.7
MSD 0.84 0.8 17.6 18.4 0.24 18.4 18.8
TRADES 0.92 0.9 13.2 13.3 0.30 15.2 15.9
AT-Madry 0.90 1.1 11.7 11.3 0.29 13.0 12.8
Worst-Case (L1,  = 24)
Normal 0.20 93.0 7.4 100.0 0.59 8.3 100.0
AT-50% 0.28 83.3 15.1 98.4 0.35 16.6 98.4
AT-100% 0.31 80.4 18.3 98.0 0.29 19.4 98.0
CCAT 0.62 50.3 8.7 58.2 0.40 10.1 87.0
MSD 0.57 50.7 17.6 68.5 0.24 18.4 68.6
TRADES 0.37 82.3 13.2 96.8 0.30 15.2 97.0
AT-Madry 0.29 86.5 11.7 97.8 0.29 13.0 97.8
PGD Conf (L1,  = 24)
Normal 0.20 93.0 7.4 100.0 0.59 8.3 100.0
AT-50% 0.29 83.3 15.1 98.4 0.35 16.6 98.4
AT-100% 0.32 80.1 18.3 97.7 0.29 19.4 97.7
CCAT 0.63 50.2 8.7 58.1 0.40 10.1 86.9
MSD 0.57 49.3 17.6 67.1 0.24 18.4 67.2
TRADES 0.37 82.3 13.2 96.8 0.30 15.2 96.9
AT-Madry 0.31 86.3 11.7 97.6 0.29 13.0 97.6
PGD CE (L1,  = 24)
Normal 0.20 92.9 7.4 99.9 0.59 8.3 99.9
AT-50% 0.52 76.3 15.1 91.3 0.35 16.6 92.5
AT-100% 0.51 72.7 18.3 90.2 0.29 19.4 91.2
CCAT 0.94 15.0 8.7 22.4 0.40 10.1 100.0
MSD 0.72 38.7 17.6 56.4 0.24 18.4 57.9
TRADES 0.59 75.6 13.2 89.9 0.30 15.2 91.2
AT-Madry 0.49 80.5 11.7 91.7 0.29 13.0 92.4
Black-Box (L1,  = 24)
Normal 0.93 8.6 7.4 14.9 0.59 8.3 17.4
AT-50% 0.93 3.5 15.1 17.9 0.35 16.6 19.7
AT-100% 0.90 3.8 18.3 20.7 0.29 19.4 21.8
CCAT 0.99 1.6 8.7 8.9 0.40 10.1 26.8
MSD 0.87 2.6 17.6 20.2 0.24 18.4 20.6
TRADES 0.89 1.7 13.2 14.0 0.30 15.2 16.7
AT-Madry 0.89 2.9 11.7 13.2 0.29 13.0 14.9
Table 18: Per-Attack Results on Cifar10, Part III (L1). Per-attack results considering PGD-CE, as in (Madry et al.,
2018), our PGD-Conf and the remaining black-box attacks for the L1 threat model. The used  values are reported in the
left-most column. For the black-box attacks, we report the per-example worst-case across all black-box attacks. In addition
to FPR and RErr we include ROC AUC, Err as well as Err and RErr in the standard, non-thresholded setting, as reference.
Confidence-Calibrated Adversarial Training
CIFAR10: Supplementary Results for L0 Adversarial Examples and Adversarial Frames
Detection Setting
τ@99%TPR
Standard Setting
τ=0
Attack Training ROC
AUC
FPR
in %
Err
in %
RErr
in %
τ
Err
in %
RErr
in %
Worst-Case (L0,  = 10)
Normal 0.80 77.7 7.4 84.6 0.59 8.3 96.2
AT-50% 0.80 59.3 15.1 74.1 0.35 16.6 75.9
AT-100% 0.75 54.7 18.3 72.0 0.29 19.4 73.2
CCAT 0.97 14.4 8.7 21.9 0.40 10.1 54.7
MSD 0.84 21.4 17.6 39.1 0.24 18.4 39.8
TRADES 0.78 22.3 13.2 35.2 0.30 15.2 37.8
AT-Madry 0.73 31.0 11.7 41.5 0.29 13.0 42.8
PGD Conf (L0,  = 10)
Normal 0.74 48.9 7.4 55.5 0.59 8.3 57.4
AT-50% 0.74 29.7 15.1 44.3 0.35 16.6 45.1
AT-100% 0.72 25.2 18.3 42.3 0.29 19.4 43.3
CCAT 0.98 5.2 8.7 12.5 0.40 10.1 34.8
MSD 0.81 5.2 17.6 22.8 0.24 18.4 23.1
TRADES 0.80 18.0 13.2 30.8 0.30 15.2 33.2
AT-Madry 0.77 21.8 11.7 32.3 0.29 13.0 33.5
PGD CE (L0,  = 10)
Normal 0.73 56.3 7.4 63.0 0.59 8.3 65.4
AT-50% 0.76 34.8 15.1 49.4 0.35 16.6 51.4
AT-100% 0.72 30.3 18.3 47.5 0.29 19.4 48.9
CCAT 1.00 0.3 8.7 7.6 0.40 10.1 79.3
MSD 0.82 5.9 17.6 23.5 0.24 18.4 23.9
TRADES 0.81 21.0 13.2 33.9 0.30 15.2 37.5
AT-Madry 0.77 26.7 11.7 37.2 0.29 13.0 39.2
Black-Box (L0,  = 10)
Normal 0.94 66.1 7.4 72.9 0.59 8.3 96.2
AT-50% 0.91 54.2 15.1 69.6 0.35 16.6 75.7
AT-100% 0.83 52.8 18.3 70.3 0.29 19.4 72.4
CCAT 0.99 12.0 8.7 19.6 0.40 10.1 96.6
MSD 0.86 22.1 17.6 39.8 0.24 18.4 41.0
TRADES 0.84 8.4 13.2 20.9 0.30 15.2 24.3
AT-Madry 0.79 15.7 11.7 26.1 0.29 13.0 27.6
Adversarial Frames
Normal 0.28 89.7 7.4 96.7 0.59 8.3 96.9
AT-50% 0.40 63.6 15.1 78.5 0.35 16.6 78.7
AT-100% 0.39 62.0 18.3 79.4 0.29 19.4 79.6
CCAT 0.75 57.4 8.7 65.6 0.40 10.1 86.7
MSD 0.38 64.7 17.6 82.5 0.24 18.4 82.6
TRADES 0.45 57.5 13.2 71.3 0.30 15.2 72.1
AT-Madry 0.48 62.0 11.7 72.9 0.29 13.0 73.3
Table 19: Per-Attack Results on Cifar10, Part IV (L0, Adversarial Frames). Per-attack results considering PGD-CE,
as in (Madry et al., 2018), our PGD-Conf and the remaining black-box attacks for the L0 threat model and adversarial
frames. The used  values are reported in the left-most column. For the black-box attacks, we report the per-example
worst-case across all black-box attacks. In addition to FPR and RErr we include ROC AUC, Err as well as Err and RErr in
the standard, non-thresholded setting, as reference.
Confidence-Calibrated Adversarial Training
MNIST-C: Supplementary Results for Corruption
Detection Setting
τ@99%TPR
Standard
Setting
τ=0
Corruption Training ROC
AUC
FPR
in %
TNR
in %
Err
in %
τ
Err
in %
all
Normal 0.75 82.8 17.2 31.9 0.98 36.4
AT-50% 0.80 59.0 41.0 4.0 1.00 26.9
AT-100% 0.78 63.5 36.5 8.6 1.00 27.4
CCAT 0.96 29.0 71.0 6.7 0.85 41.5
MSD 0.75 75.0 25.0 5.4 0.51 14.0
TRADES 0.79 74.1 25.9 5.5 0.92 16.1
mean
Normal 0.75 82.8 17.2 32.8 1.0 36.3
AT-50% 0.80 59.0 41.0 12.6 1.0 26.9
AT-100% 0.78 63.5 36.5 17.6 1.0 27.4
CCAT 0.96 29.0 71.0 5.7 0.9 41.5
MSD 0.75 75.0 25.0 6.0 0.5 14.0
TRADES 0.79 74.1 25.9 7.9 0.9 16.1
brightness
Normal 0.36 100.0 0.0 90.2 0.98 90.2
AT-50% 0.99 0.9 99.1 36.4 1.00 84.3
AT-100% 0.97 35.4 64.6 82.2 1.00 90.9
CCAT 1.00 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.85 90.5
MSD 0.95 38.7 61.3 0.1 0.51 23.1
TRADES 0.95 43.7 56.3 67.3 0.92 77.2
canny edges
Normal 0.91 62.4 37.6 34.8 0.98 45.6
AT-50% 0.96 28.8 71.2 33.4 1.00 53.2
AT-100% 0.94 35.3 64.7 38.2 1.00 53.4
CCAT 0.99 34.3 65.7 70.5 0.85 61.9
MSD 0.87 63.4 36.6 5.5 0.51 17.8
TRADES 0.92 53.2 46.8 21.5 0.92 36.3
dotted line
Normal 0.76 85.4 14.6 2.4 0.98 7.6
AT-50% 0.77 72.8 27.2 0.9 1.00 7.9
AT-100% 0.75 74.5 25.5 0.9 1.00 6.4
CCAT 0.98 53.4 46.6 2.5 0.85 10.1
MSD 0.60 94.2 5.8 1.1 0.51 2.9
TRADES 0.73 84.5 15.5 0.5 0.92 4.2
fog
Normal 0.38 99.9 0.1 90.2 0.98 90.2
AT-50% 0.90 29.7 70.3 10.4 1.00 59.0
AT-100% 0.88 46.3 53.7 37.7 1.00 62.0
CCAT 1.00 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.85 90.3
MSD 0.92 46.8 53.2 4.3 0.51 26.1
TRADES 0.87 60.9 39.1 14.3 0.92 35.8
glass blur
Normal 0.87 71.6 28.4 57.2 0.98 56.2
AT-50% 0.82 67.4 32.6 1.2 1.00 11.0
AT-100% 0.77 70.5 29.5 1.1 1.00 8.5
CCAT 1.00 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.85 86.8
MSD 0.69 89.1 10.9 1.7 0.51 4.9
TRADES 0.81 80.9 19.1 0.6 0.92 6.0
impulse noise
Normal 0.87 72.4 27.6 79.2 0.98 81.3
AT-50% 0.98 13.9 86.1 18.8 1.00 61.4
AT-100% 0.97 18.8 81.2 12.8 1.00 56.2
CCAT 1.00 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.85 69.1
MSD 0.83 69.4 30.6 0.7 0.51 8.2
TRADES 0.91 57.3 42.7 2.2 0.92 17.2
motion blur
Normal 0.86 73.9 26.1 29.5 0.98 37.2
AT-50% 0.62 90.6 9.4 0.3 1.00 2.7
AT-100% 0.58 91.3 8.7 0.3 1.00 2.4
CCAT 1.00 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.85 75.6
MSD 0.74 83.1 16.9 3.6 0.51 9.1
TRADES 0.71 88.3 11.7 0.6 0.92 4.0
rotate
Normal 0.70 92.4 7.6 1.7 0.98 4.6
AT-50% 0.64 87.9 12.1 0.8 1.00 4.1
AT-100% 0.63 87.2 12.8 0.8 1.00 4.5
CCAT 0.98 41.5 58.5 0.3 0.85 4.4
MSD 0.64 90.7 9.3 5.7 0.51 9.7
TRADES 0.66 87.7 12.3 1.4 0.92 4.8
Table 20: Per-Corruptions Results on MNIST-C, PART I. Results on MNIST-C, broken down by individual corruptions
(first column); mean are the averaged results over all corruptions. We report ROC AUC, FPR and the true negative rate
(TNR) in addition to the thresholded and unthresholded Err on the corrupted examples. The table is continued in Tab. 21.
Confidence-Calibrated Adversarial Training
MNIST-C: Supplementary Results for Corruption
Detection Setting
τ@99%TPR
Standard
Setting
τ=0
Corruption Training ROC
AUC
FPR
in %
TNR
in %
Err
in %
τ
Err
in %
scale
Normal 0.84 89.5 10.5 0.7 0.98 3.1
AT-50% 0.86 78.5 21.5 0.1 1.00 3.0
AT-100% 0.80 82.1 17.9 0.4 1.00 3.0
CCAT 0.75 96.7 3.3 0.8 0.85 2.0
MSD 0.84 64.4 35.6 8.1 0.51 18.1
TRADES 0.82 84.4 15.6 0.3 0.92 2.9
shear
Normal 0.60 97.6 2.4 0.2 0.98 0.8
AT-50% 0.56 95.1 4.9 0.1 1.00 0.9
AT-100% 0.55 94.8 5.2 0.1 1.00 0.9
CCAT 0.98 27.4 72.6 0.0 0.85 1.1
MSD 0.56 95.9 4.1 1.9 0.51 3.2
TRADES 0.61 94.8 5.2 0.3 0.92 1.4
shot noise
Normal 0.74 93.0 7.0 1.4 0.98 3.6
AT-50% 0.62 91.3 8.7 0.2 1.00 1.9
AT-100% 0.57 92.6 7.4 0.2 1.00 1.8
CCAT 0.96 61.2 38.8 0.1 0.85 2.3
MSD 0.59 95.2 4.8 0.9 0.51 2.4
TRADES 0.65 94.9 5.1 0.2 0.92 1.4
spatter
Normal 0.85 72.8 27.2 18.9 0.98 28.1
AT-50% 0.65 88.3 11.7 0.6 1.00 3.6
AT-100% 0.61 90.3 9.7 0.4 1.00 2.7
CCAT 1.00 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.85 29.7
MSD 0.56 95.6 4.4 1.2 0.51 2.6
TRADES 0.63 90.4 9.6 0.7 0.92 3.3
stripe
Normal 0.92 61.1 38.9 69.6 0.98 70.2
AT-50% 0.98 12.2 87.8 83.8 1.00 81.3
AT-100% 0.99 12.4 87.6 88.2 1.00 87.4
CCAT 1.00 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.85 78.0
MSD 0.90 55.8 44.2 1.1 0.51 10.4
TRADES 0.88 72.9 27.1 0.6 0.92 5.9
translate
Normal 0.72 95.2 4.8 0.3 0.98 1.6
AT-50% 0.80 74.6 25.4 0.2 1.00 4.0
AT-100% 0.79 72.4 27.6 0.2 1.00 4.2
CCAT 0.84 95.3 4.7 0.3 0.85 1.4
MSD 0.88 59.3 40.7 44.7 0.51 55.2
TRADES 0.94 42.3 57.7 6.3 0.92 28.1
zigzag
Normal 0.85 74.5 25.5 16.3 0.98 24.8
AT-50% 0.87 53.6 46.4 10.9 1.00 24.9
AT-100% 0.87 48.3 51.7 10.1 1.00 25.8
CCAT 0.99 25.6 74.4 9.8 0.85 18.6
MSD 0.70 83.5 16.5 9.7 0.51 15.8
TRADES 0.76 75.2 24.8 4.9 0.92 13.8
Table 21: Per-Corruptions Results on MNIST-C, PART II. Continued results of Tab. 20 including results on MNIST-C
focusing on individual corruptions. textttmean are the averaged results over all corruptions. We report ROC AUC, FPR and
the true negative rate (TNR) in addition to the thresholded and unthresholded Err on the corrupted examples.
Confidence-Calibrated Adversarial Training
CIFAR10-C: Supplementary Results for Corruption
Detection Setting
τ@99%TPR
Standard
Setting
τ=0
Corruption Training ROC
AUC
FPR
in %
TNR
in %
Err
in %
τ
Err
in %
all
Normal 0.57 97.1 2.9 12.2 0.59 13.7
AT-50% 0.53 96.2 3.8 16.2 0.35 18.1
AT-100% 0.53 97.2 2.8 19.6 0.29 20.9
CCAT 0.66 72.1 27.9 10.4 0.40 27.2
MSD 0.53 98.2 1.8 19.2 0.24 20.2
TRADES 0.53 95.8 4.2 15.0 0.30 17.3
AT-Madry 0.53 96.3 3.7 12.8 0.29 14.7
mean
Normal 0.57 97.1 2.9 12.3 0.6 13.7
AT-50% 0.53 96.2 3.8 16.2 0.3 18.1
AT-100% 0.53 97.2 2.8 19.6 0.3 21.0
CCAT 0.66 72.1 27.9 8.5 0.4 27.2
MSD 0.53 98.2 1.8 19.3 0.2 20.2
TRADES 0.53 95.8 4.2 15.0 0.3 17.3
AT-Madry 0.53 96.3 3.7 12.9 0.3 14.7
brightness
Normal 0.50 98.1 1.9 7.5 0.59 8.4
AT-50% 0.50 97.0 3.0 14.9 0.35 16.5
AT-100% 0.50 97.9 2.1 18.2 0.29 19.2
CCAT 0.54 94.8 5.2 8.2 0.40 10.4
MSD 0.50 98.6 1.4 17.8 0.24 18.5
TRADES 0.49 96.8 3.2 13.1 0.30 14.9
AT-Madry 0.49 97.5 2.5 11.2 0.29 12.5
contrast
Normal 0.52 98.1 1.9 8.4 0.59 9.4
AT-50% 0.60 94.1 5.9 17.1 0.35 20.0
AT-100% 0.60 95.2 4.8 21.1 0.29 23.5
CCAT 0.55 96.6 3.4 10.3 0.40 11.9
MSD 0.60 97.3 2.7 22.2 0.24 23.5
TRADES 0.58 94.4 5.6 17.2 0.30 20.2
AT-Madry 0.58 94.6 5.4 13.5 0.29 16.3
defocus blur
Normal 0.50 98.1 1.9 7.4 0.59 8.4
AT-50% 0.51 96.8 3.2 15.5 0.35 17.2
AT-100% 0.51 97.7 2.3 18.6 0.29 19.7
CCAT 0.49 97.5 2.5 9.2 0.40 10.5
MSD 0.51 98.5 1.5 18.2 0.24 19.0
TRADES 0.51 96.3 3.7 13.7 0.30 15.7
AT-Madry 0.51 96.9 3.1 12.0 0.29 13.6
elastic transform
Normal 0.60 97.3 2.7 12.1 0.59 13.5
AT-50% 0.57 95.8 4.2 19.0 0.35 21.1
AT-100% 0.57 96.7 3.3 22.0 0.29 23.6
CCAT 0.54 96.5 3.5 13.2 0.40 14.9
MSD 0.57 98.0 2.0 21.0 0.24 22.2
TRADES 0.56 95.0 5.0 17.5 0.30 20.0
AT-Madry 0.58 96.0 4.0 15.5 0.29 17.6
fog
Normal 0.51 98.0 2.0 7.9 0.59 8.8
AT-50% 0.57 94.7 5.3 15.7 0.35 18.3
AT-100% 0.57 96.1 3.9 19.5 0.29 21.5
CCAT 0.55 96.0 4.0 9.0 0.40 11.1
MSD 0.57 97.5 2.5 19.7 0.24 21.0
TRADES 0.55 95.2 4.8 15.0 0.30 17.5
AT-Madry 0.55 95.3 4.7 12.2 0.29 14.7
frost
Normal 0.57 97.2 2.8 11.5 0.59 12.8
AT-50% 0.53 95.9 4.1 16.0 0.35 18.0
AT-100% 0.53 96.9 3.1 20.1 0.29 21.6
CCAT 0.65 88.1 11.9 9.0 0.40 12.5
MSD 0.52 98.2 1.8 20.6 0.24 21.4
TRADES 0.51 96.0 4.0 14.7 0.30 16.8
AT-Madry 0.51 96.7 3.3 12.1 0.29 13.6
gaussian blur
Normal 0.50 98.0 2.0 7.4 0.59 8.4
AT-50% 0.51 96.8 3.2 15.5 0.35 17.1
AT-100% 0.51 97.7 2.3 18.6 0.29 19.7
CCAT 0.49 97.4 2.6 9.2 0.40 10.4
MSD 0.51 98.5 1.5 18.1 0.24 19.0
TRADES 0.51 96.3 3.7 13.7 0.30 15.7
AT-Madry 0.51 96.9 3.1 12.0 0.29 13.5
gaussian noise
Normal 0.62 96.2 3.8 15.7 0.59 17.7
AT-50% 0.51 96.8 3.2 15.5 0.35 17.0
AT-100% 0.51 97.7 2.3 18.6 0.29 19.8
CCAT 1.00 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.40 84.9
MSD 0.51 98.5 1.5 18.6 0.24 19.3
TRADES 0.52 96.0 4.0 14.3 0.30 16.5
AT-Madry 0.52 96.7 3.3 12.2 0.29 13.9
glass blur
Normal 0.76 92.5 7.5 40.8 0.59 43.1
AT-50% 0.58 95.4 4.6 18.0 0.35 20.2
AT-100% 0.56 97.2 2.8 21.1 0.29 22.4
CCAT 0.93 31.1 68.9 14.7 0.40 31.8
MSD 0.56 98.1 1.9 21.0 0.24 22.0
TRADES 0.56 95.1 4.9 17.6 0.30 20.1
AT-Madry 0.58 95.5 4.5 15.4 0.29 17.6
Table 22: Per-Corruptions Results on Cifar10-C, PART I. Results on Cifar10-C focusing on individual corruptions (first
column); textttmean are the averaged results over all corruptions. We report ROC AUC, FPR and the true negative rate
(TNR) in addition to the thresholded and unthresholded Err on the corrupted examples. The table is continued in Tab. 23.
Confidence-Calibrated Adversarial Training
CIFAR10-C: Supplementary Results for Corruption
Detection Setting
τ@99%TPR
Standard
Setting
τ=0
Corruption Training ROC
AUC
FPR
in %
TNR
in %
Err
in %
τ
Err
in %
impulse noise
Normal 0.59 97.0 3.0 13.1 0.59 14.5
AT-50% 0.53 96.4 3.6 16.4 0.35 17.9
AT-100% 0.52 97.6 2.4 19.8 0.29 21.1
CCAT 1.00 0.1 99.9 0.0 0.40 61.0
MSD 0.51 98.4 1.6 18.3 0.24 19.2
TRADES 0.54 94.9 5.1 15.7 0.30 18.4
AT-Madry 0.53 96.1 3.9 13.3 0.29 15.3
jpeg compression
Normal 0.59 96.9 3.1 12.3 0.59 13.7
AT-50% 0.51 96.8 3.2 15.5 0.35 17.0
AT-100% 0.51 97.6 2.4 18.9 0.29 20.2
CCAT 0.59 93.3 6.7 9.3 0.40 12.1
MSD 0.51 98.3 1.7 18.3 0.24 19.3
TRADES 0.51 96.3 3.7 14.4 0.30 16.6
AT-Madry 0.52 96.5 3.5 12.6 0.29 14.4
motion blur
Normal 0.58 97.3 2.7 10.9 0.59 12.2
AT-50% 0.55 95.9 4.1 16.8 0.35 18.9
AT-100% 0.54 97.1 2.9 19.9 0.29 21.3
CCAT 0.52 96.5 3.5 11.9 0.40 13.6
MSD 0.54 98.1 1.9 19.7 0.24 20.7
TRADES 0.54 95.8 4.2 15.7 0.30 17.9
AT-Madry 0.55 95.9 4.1 13.3 0.29 15.6
pixelate
Normal 0.54 97.6 2.4 9.7 0.59 10.9
AT-50% 0.51 96.7 3.3 15.3 0.35 17.0
AT-100% 0.51 97.8 2.2 18.6 0.29 19.7
CCAT 0.52 97.0 3.0 9.2 0.40 10.8
MSD 0.51 98.4 1.6 18.2 0.24 19.1
TRADES 0.51 96.4 3.6 14.0 0.30 16.0
AT-Madry 0.51 97.1 2.9 12.1 0.29 13.6
saturate
Normal 0.55 97.5 2.5 10.0 0.59 11.3
AT-50% 0.55 95.3 4.7 18.2 0.35 20.5
AT-100% 0.54 96.0 4.0 21.3 0.29 23.3
CCAT 0.48 97.6 2.4 11.8 0.40 13.0
MSD 0.55 97.3 2.7 20.9 0.24 22.1
TRADES 0.53 95.0 5.0 15.6 0.30 18.2
AT-Madry 0.54 95.2 4.8 14.2 0.29 16.4
shot noise
Normal 0.58 97.0 3.0 12.1 0.59 13.7
AT-50% 0.51 97.1 2.9 15.4 0.35 16.7
AT-100% 0.50 97.7 2.3 18.5 0.29 19.6
CCAT 1.00 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.40 84.5
MSD 0.51 98.5 1.5 18.1 0.24 18.9
TRADES 0.51 96.2 3.8 13.7 0.30 15.8
AT-Madry 0.51 97.1 2.9 11.8 0.29 13.4
snow
Normal 0.57 97.3 2.7 12.1 0.59 13.5
AT-50% 0.51 96.7 3.3 15.3 0.35 17.0
AT-100% 0.51 97.5 2.5 18.8 0.29 20.1
CCAT 0.58 95.6 4.4 11.2 0.40 13.3
MSD 0.51 98.4 1.6 18.7 0.24 19.6
TRADES 0.50 96.3 3.7 14.1 0.30 16.1
AT-Madry 0.51 97.0 3.0 12.3 0.29 13.8
spatter
Normal 0.54 97.5 2.5 9.4 0.59 10.6
AT-50% 0.51 96.8 3.2 15.5 0.35 17.2
AT-100% 0.51 97.6 2.4 18.5 0.29 19.8
CCAT 0.58 95.2 4.8 9.3 0.40 11.6
MSD 0.51 98.3 1.7 18.0 0.24 18.8
TRADES 0.51 96.0 4.0 14.2 0.30 16.4
AT-Madry 0.51 96.7 3.3 12.3 0.29 13.9
speckle noise
Normal 0.57 97.0 3.0 12.4 0.59 13.8
AT-50% 0.51 97.1 2.9 15.2 0.35 16.7
AT-100% 0.51 97.7 2.3 18.4 0.29 19.5
CCAT 1.00 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.40 83.0
MSD 0.51 98.4 1.6 17.9 0.24 18.8
TRADES 0.51 96.4 3.6 13.8 0.30 15.9
AT-Madry 0.51 96.9 3.1 12.0 0.29 13.4
zoom blur
Normal 0.61 96.7 3.3 12.9 0.59 14.6
AT-50% 0.56 95.7 4.3 17.2 0.35 19.2
AT-100% 0.56 97.0 3.0 21.1 0.29 22.4
CCAT 0.52 97.1 2.9 13.9 0.40 15.6
MSD 0.56 98.0 2.0 20.5 0.24 21.5
TRADES 0.55 95.4 4.6 17.0 0.30 19.2
AT-Madry 0.56 95.7 4.3 14.3 0.29 16.4
Table 23: Per-Corruptions Results on Cifar10-C, PART II Continued results of Tab. 22 including results on Cifar10-C
focusing on individual corruptions. textttmean are the averaged results over all corruptions. We report ROC AUC, FPR and
the true negative rate (TNR) in addition to the thresholded and unthresholded Err on the corrupted examples.
